Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2022

Are the Federal Rules of Evidence Unconstitutional?
Ethan J. Leib

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Courts Commons

ARE THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
ETHAN J. LEIB*
The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) rest on an unacceptably shaky
constitutional foundation. Unlike other regimes of federal rulemaking—for
Civil Procedure, for Criminal Procedure, and for Appellate Procedure—the FRE
rulemaking process contemplated by the Rules Enabling Act is both formally and
functionally defective because Congress enacted the FRE as a statute first but
purports to permit the Supreme Court to revise, repeal, and amend those laws
over time, operating as a kind of supercharged administrative agency with the
authority to countermand congressional statutes. Formally, this system violates
the constitutionally-delineated separation of powers as announced in Chadha,
Clinton, and the non-delegation doctrine because it allows statutes of the
United States to be effectively rewritten by the Supreme Court outside the
constraints of bicameralism and presentment, requirements of Article I, Section
7. Especially in light of the Court’s signals in recent terms that it may be seeking
to revivify the non-delegation doctrine soon, focusing on the FRE’s formal
deficiencies is urgent. Yet functionalists about the separation of powers also need
to condemn our current FRE rulemaking process. Functionally, the FRE
rulemaking system is constitutionally suspect because it permits the Supreme
Court—outside of its Article III authority to hear “cases and controversies”—to
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repeal and amend substantive statutes unilaterally, a power that can threaten
bedrock commitments to our federalism and to our constitutional rights to the
jury. The decisions about how and when to displace state law in favor of federal
law and about how and when to grant powers to juries over judges cannot be
vested in the Judicial Branch alone without the structural restraints of an Article
III “case or controversy.” The paper concludes by offering some ways to fix our
evidence law and to put it on firmer footing, permitting better power-sharing
and dialogue between two branches of government—Congress and the Supreme
Court—that both have reasonable claims to some authority in the area.
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This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . . The rules were
enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have been
amended by Acts of Congress, and further amended by the United States Supreme
Court.
—The Foreword to the Federal Rules of Evidence
U.S. Government Publishing Office
Washington: 20181
INTRODUCTION
Something is rotten in the state of the Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE).
Like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the FRE can be revised, amended, updated, or repealed through a
process specified by the Rules Enabling Act (REA).2 The REA in its
current form—adopted first in 1934 and amended substantially in
19883—has four core components. First, the Supreme Court has “the
power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules
of evidence for cases in the [lower federal courts]”4 and may use the
Judicial Conference and committees to assist it.5 Second, the Court
must submit proposed rules to Congress with an “explanatory note,”

1. Bob Goodlatte, Foreword to Fed. R. Evid.
2. Laws and Procedures Governing the Work of the Rules Committees, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/laws-and-proce
dures-governing-work-rules-committees [https://perma.cc/5CJZ-H2CN].
3. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, §§ 1–2, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071–77).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). In the first version of the REA, the statute only delegated
the right to make “rules of practice and procedure,” which led to some skepticism
about whether the Supreme Court even had the authority to promulgate rules of
evidence. See Order of November 20, 1972, 409 U.S. 1132, 1132–33 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“I doubt if rules of evidence are within the purview of the statute under
which we are authorized to submit proposed Rules to Congress . . . . I can find no
legislative history that rules of evidence were to be included in ‘practice and
procedure’ as used in [the Rules Enabling Act of 1934] . . . . The words ‘practice and
procedure’ in the setting of the Act seem to me to exclude rules of evidence.”).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2073. For ease of exposition, I will mostly focus on the Court as
being invested with the power of prescription under § 2072 and the power of reporting
and promulgating the Rules under § 2074, notwithstanding § 2073’s presumption that
the Court will do its work through the Judicial Conference and relevant committees.

914

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:911

and Congress then has an opportunity to countermand the proposed
rules through law of its own.6 Third, as a side-constraint, the rules the
Court promulgates may “not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”7 And, finally, once a waiting period passes to give
Congress time to decide whether it wants to countermand a Supreme
Court proposal for a rule, “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be
of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect,” a
provision known as the “supersession clause.”8 Although Congress
specifically excepted rules surrounding evidentiary privileges from
those covered by this REA process,9 the federal rulemaking regime
covering civil procedure rules, criminal procedure rules, appellate
procedure rules, and evidence law is otherwise subject to this
framework statute.
But the FRE is unique in the tapestry of Federal Rules in that
Congress decided to countermand wholesale the Supreme Court’s
proposal for evidentiary rules by staying them in 197310 and then
passing the FRE as a statutory regime in 1975.11 This means that all
revisions, amendments, updates, and repeals that go through the REA
process and become law through the supersession provision effectively
change statutory law that Congress passed and the President signed.
6. §§ 2073–74(a). In the first version of the REA, this so-called “report-and-wait”
provision was less clear about whether Congress had to countermand through an
actual statute that met the Constitution’s Article I, Section 7 requirements of
bicameralism and presentment. The current version of the REA is more explicit in this
regard.
More interesting, perhaps, is that the FRE’s Enabling Act of 1975 was explicit
that a one-house veto was sufficient for disapproving an amendment of the FRE by the
Supreme Court. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1948 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2076 (since repealed)) (“[I]f either House of Congress within [the reportand-wait] time shall by resolution disapprove any amendment so reported it shall not
take effect.”). How quirky, then, that the Supreme Court pointed to the FRE as
evidence that the REA did not really violate the ban on legislative vetoes effectuated
through INS v. Chadha! 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). More on this below, infra Section
II.A.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
8. Id. Some refer to this provision as the “abrogation clause.” I’ll stick with
“supersession,” as it is more distinctive to the REA context.
9. § 2074(b) (“Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary
privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.”).
10. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (“An Act to promote the
separation of constitutional powers by suspending the effectiveness of the Rules of
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates . . . transmitted to the Congress by
the Chief Justice on February 5, 1973, until approved by Act of Congress.”).
11. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
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Whatever else is permissible in light of the supposed death of the nondelegation doctrine, this delegation to the Supreme Court to alter,
erase, or make ineffective statutes of the United States should be
considered invalid under currently-settled constitutional law. The
Supreme Court should not be able to repeal congressional statutes,
especially outside of its core judicial power of adjudicating actual cases
or controversies. This conclusion follows not only under the necessary
formal implications of INS v. Chadha,12 Clinton v. City of New York,13 and
the non-delegation doctrine, but also for functional reasons having to
do with the special way rules of evidence tend to both be more likely
to abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights,14 and more likely to
implicate federalism concerns and the rights to the jury in the U.S.
Constitution. Thus, what is at stake here is not just an application of a
set of doctrines (however criticized) that come together to undermine
the foundation of our evidence rule-making system, but also structural
commitments set in place to assure the functioning of our democracy.
Part I concludes that, as applied to the FRE, the REA process is
constitutionally defective at its core for both formal and functional
reasons. Part II then reviews the kinds of apologies others have made
for supersession generally (often in the context of civil procedure
rules, where the debate about supersession has sometimes been
ventilated but without the complexity of the statutory nature of the
FRE)—and tries to offer whatever defenses might be available for the
FRE amendment system particularly (a context where the problems for
supersession are more severe and less acknowledged). Part III
concludes with some thoughts about how to rectify the formal and
functional deficiencies with the FRE, charting a way forward. With
some renovations, Congress can fix the REA and FRE without
upending too much federal practice. Ultimately, the separation of
powers demands a better rulemaking system for our federal rules about
evidence law.

12. 462 U.S. 919, 954–55, 957 n.22 (1983) (holding that the legislative veto is
unconstitutional for failure to comply with Article I, Section 7 requirements in the
Constitution).
13. 524 U.S. 417, 438–39 (1998) (holding the “Line Item Veto Act” to violate the
Constitution under the authority of Chadha).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b).

916

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:911

I. WHY SUPERSESSION FOR THE FRE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL: FORM
AND FUNCTION
It took about forty years after the REA’s passage in 1934 for the
Supreme Court to have the audacity to promulgate a version of the
FRE.15 There are several reasons that might have been so. On the one
hand, the Court may have had constitutional and policy doubts of its
own about a federally unified regime of evidence law, notwithstanding
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.16 in 1941.17 In that case, three years after the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, barely
recognizing its own conflict of interest in the case in adjudicating its
own power to prescribe the Federal Rules, the Court blessed
Congress’s effort to delegate rulemaking power over civil procedure
rules to the Supreme Court itself.18 Yet the constitutional and policy
implications of Sibbach for a federal evidence law—a traditional area of
so much judicial discretion19 and an area that so often implicates
15. See Jon R. Waltz, The New Federal Rules of Evidence: An Overview, 52 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 346, 348 (1975) (detailing the path of the new Federal Rules of Evidence that the
Supreme Court promulgated in 1972).
16. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
17. See Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the
Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 264 (1984) (explaining the worry that a
uniform Federal Rules of Evidence would lead to an increase in appeals, more reversals
on evidentiary rulings, and that lawyers would “have a field day determining how many
evidentiary angels can dance on the top of a pin”).
18. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10, 15.
19. Wigmore, in many ways the father of modern evidence law, was quite
committed to thinking about evidence as essentially committed to judicial discretion—
and for that reason, among others, tended to oppose unified evidence codes. See
ANDREW PORWANCHER, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE: THE HIDDEN
ORIGINS OF MODERN LAW 114–19 (2016). Others similarly saw evidence as importantly
discretionary, which influenced their views about how codified evidence ought to be
(including James Bradley Thayer, one of Wigmore’s important early influences, see
WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 5–6 (1985) (arguing
that Thayer “exerted tremendous influence through his teaching [and] his casebooks
on evidence”). See generally Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform:
Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2437, 2439 (2000). It remains a widely-held view that
evidence law is an area of significant judicial discretion even after codification. See Jon
R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
79 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1119–20 (1984) (“[T]he amount of discretion in the admission
of evidence conferred by the Federal Rules is quantitatively undramatic . . . .”); Victor
J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
59, 95 (1984) (arguing that judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence gives
judges immense power to “decide what social and political attitudes will be used to
litigate issues of life, liberty, and property”); Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of
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matters of substantive state law and the constitutional right to the
jury—may have led to reasonable hesitation to conclude that evidence
was culturally “procedural” and should be treated the same way as the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the purposes of the REA.
There were also reasonable concerns about the Court’s statutory
authority too, since the original version of the REA in 1934 failed to
grant the Court a right to promulgate evidence laws explicitly, focusing
instead on “general” rules of “practice” and “procedure.”20 The
predecessor statute to the REA—the Conformity Act of 187221—had
directed the lower federal courts to “conform” their “practice,
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding” in actions at law to
those “existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the
State” within which each court was located. But evidence law got a
special carve-out: it proclaimed that it did not “alter the rules of
evidence under the laws of the United States, and as practiced in the
courts thereof.”22 Thus it is possible that the REA was reasonably read
at first not to extend to evidence law (even though it did not have an
overt carve-out as the Conformity Act did).
In the conventional telling,23 however, when the Court decided the
1965 case of Hanna v. Plumer24—which seemed to allow any Federal
Rule that was “arguably procedural” to preempt state law25—a stalled
FRE project got the activation energy it needed.26 If the FRE was going
Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 427 (1989) (advocating
for the concept that judicial discretion under the FRE is not motivated by “the Rules’
policy in favor of admissibility”). But see David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in
Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937, 939 (1990) (challenging the view that the FRE
permit widespread trial court discretion).
20. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, §§ 1–2, 48 Stat. 1064. Indeed, some
leading evidence scholars before the FRE opposed codification precisely because
evidentiary decisions—so often context-driven—had to be particularized and
discretionary. See Swift, supra note 19, at 2442 (identifying Thayer and Morgan as
opponents of “rules” of evidence that might limit trial court discretion in particular
cases).
21. Ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196.
22. Id. § 5, 17 Stat. at 197.
23. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act,
1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 298 (1989); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1018–22 (1982).
24. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
25. Id. at 476.
26. See James Wm. Moore & Helen I. Bendix, Congress, Evidence and Rulemaking, 84
YALE L.J. 9, 24–25 (1974) (“Hanna v. Plumer is also important because of the timing of
the decision: Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court followed by only a short
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to be “arguably procedural,” there would be less question about it
being validly promulgated and controlling in the lower federal
courts.27 Still, Hanna notwithstanding, Congress balked and did not
allow the Supreme Court to use its then-existing REA authority in 1972
to create a new unified evidence code.28 By disallowing the Supreme
Court to use the REA as it then existed in 1973,29 Congress put the
brakes on the FRE until it could enact them itself a few years later. And
in passing the FRE in 1975,30 Congress also passed an “enabling act”
on the model of the REA to allow for further revisions by the Supreme
Court.31 That enabling act made clear that, from that point forward,
the general REA was going to treat evidence as enough like procedure
that the Supreme Court would have statutory authority to promulgate
amendments, revisions, and updates to the FRE, too—albeit subject to
the REA’s side-constraint about “substantive rights.”32 And Congress
signed onto a supersession clause for the FRE in 1975 as well—which
has importantly different implications for an evidence law that was
enacted by Congress itself.33
What follows in this Part is a case for the unconstitutionality of the
revision process the current REA envisions for the FRE. That case has
both formal (Section I.A) and functional (Section I.B) dimensions.
A. Form
The core of the formal case against supersession in connection with
the FRE is relatively simple. In short, allowing the Supreme Court’s
FRE rulemaking authority to supersede congressional statutes that
were clearly delineated, drafted, and deliberated upon violates the
constitutionally demarcated separation of powers enunciated in INS v.

time his appointment of the Advisory Committee for the Rules of Evidence, thereby
implying his acceptance of the view that the Court’s authority under the Enabling Act
extended to the code of evidence . . . .”).
27. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476.
28. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
29. See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
30. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
32. Id.
33. See generally Carrington, supra note 23, at 322–23 (discussing supersession
provisions and how they affect Congressional rulemaking).
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Chadha34 (Section I.A.1), Clinton v. City of New York35 (Section I.A.2),
and in the non-delegation doctrine (Section I.A.3).36
1. Chadha
Most people remember the Chadha decision as the “legislative veto”
case, holding all legislative vetoes unconstitutional for their failure to
comply with core Article I, Section 7 bicameralism and presentment
requirements for lawmaking. On the chopping block in that case was
a provision within the Immigration and Nationality Act which
purported to allow either chamber in Congress to overturn by
resolution an attorney general decision to suspend a deportation,
pursuant to otherwise delegated authority to the Executive Branch.37
The majority held invalid this device to share executive power because
it felt the separation of powers that the Constitution announces does
not permit a mixing of functions in the way the statute envisioned.38
Although Justice Powell’s concurrence focused on the way the
arrangement allowed a single chamber in Congress to co-opt and
exercise adjudicatory functions,39 the opinion for the Court
emphasized the need for all laws of the United States to be vetted
through the bicameralism and presentment requirements
contemplated by the Constitution’s Article I.40
Although, formally speaking, the current REA with a supersession
provision in connection with the FRE is not identical to a legislative
veto, Chadha’s relevance to the REA and FRE did not go unnoticed by
the Court itself, even in 1983. To wit, the Court’s footnote nine
meditated on the relationship between the statute it was invalidating
and another important statute in the legal corpus it did not want
affected by its decision. The Court wrote that,
§ 244 resembles the “report and wait” provision approved by the
Court in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. The statute examined
in Sibbach [i.e., the REA of 1934] provided that the newly
promulgated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “shall not take effect
until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney
General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983).
524 U.S. 417, 437–38 (1998).
See infra notes 75, 77 and accompanying text.
8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957–59.
Id. at 964–65 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 946–51 (majority opinion).
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the close of such session.” This statute did not provide that Congress
could unilaterally veto the Federal Rules. Rather, it gave Congress
the opportunity to review the Rules before they became effective and
to pass legislation barring their effectiveness if the Rules were found
objectionable. This technique was used by Congress when it acted in
1973 to stay, and ultimately to revise, the proposed Rules of
Evidence.41

In short, the majority sought to distinguish the REA from the
invalidated legislative veto in Chadha by highlighting that when
Congress wanted to countermand the Supreme Court’s proposal for
the FRE in 1973, it did so through statute rather than resolution. True
enough, Congress decided to halt and delay the adoption of the FRE
through a statutory mechanism rather than “mere” resolution. But it
may have done so not because the REA, as it then existed, actually
required as much but because it wanted to stay the FRE adoption
process for a substantial amount of time (beyond the amount of time
permissible under the then-existing REA) so it could enact its own
comprehensive approach to evidence law itself. There was real
ambiguity about whether the original 1934 REA meant to delegate the
formulation of evidence law through the Federal Rules regime—and
Congress ultimately resolved that ambiguity in 1975 by amending the
REA to make clear that it would cover evidence going forward (but in
a way that almost confirms that it did not as of 1934).42
Yet it must be noted that when Congress amended the REA at the
same time it adopted the FRE as a statutory system in 1975, it actually
made clearer that further countermanding by Congress could be
accomplished through resolution of either chamber rather than requiring
that Congress countermand through statute.43 The dissent properly
picked up on this feature of the congressional adoption of the FRE,
showing the majority that if it was serious about no more one-house
vetoes, many statutes—including the REA as applied to the FRE as of
1983—would be rendered invalid.44 From this perspective, footnote
nine is an embarrassment to the Court’s Chadha opinion: the REA circa
1975, itself amended by the very process the Court cites to prove the
41. Id. at 935 n.9 (citations omitted).
42. Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1041–42 (1993).
43. See Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93–95, § 2, 88 Stat. 1926, 1948, (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2076) (proposed amendments to the FRE by Supreme Court may be
disapproved by one-house resolution).
44. Chadha, 462 U.S at 1003, 1009 (White, J., dissenting).
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REA’s immunity from Chadhamaggedon,45 had a pretty explicit
Chadha problem, since it enacted a one-house legislative veto. Awkward
stuff.
It is true that Congress, some years after Chadha, removed from the
REA the specific feature that was most offensive in light of Chadha’s
most direct holding. That is, when Congress passed the 1988
amendments to the REA (bringing the REA into its present
configuration), the REA was shorn of its one-house veto provision. It is
now clear for all Federal Rules regimes that the “report-and-wait”
provision for revisions contemplates congressional countermanding
through statutory action rather than one-house or two-house
resolutions, though this was not true of the REA circa 1983 when
Chadha came down.
But that does not mean all Chadha problems with the REA
disappeared with the 1988 amendments. Although there is no longer
a legislative veto provision in the REA, there is an Article 1, Section 7
violation every time the Supreme Court purports to revise or repeal
the statutory FRE. That is, because of supersession, the issue is not that
Congress reserves a veto for itself but that congressional law gets
effectively repealed, amended, or altered without proper adherence to
bicameralism and presentment requirements under the Constitution.
This is as much at the core of Chadha’s holding as the specific
application to one-house veto provisions. Although functionalist46 and
formalist47 cases later identified the core of Chadha as focused on
congressional self-aggrandizement, some other formal cases—such as
Clinton—helped reinforce the constitutional commitment to Article 1,
Section 7 requirements for lawmaking, law amending, and law
repealing as essential to Chadha’s holding, as well. The FRE, which
started as a statute in 1975 but is subject to amendment and repeal
through the REA process, is ultimately not compliant with the

45. Yes, I am trademarking that.
46. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988). Carrington uses the Morrison
gloss on Chadha to minimize its force, see Carrington, supra note 23, at 326. But since
he is not focused on the way supersession works specifically in connection with the
FRE, he underestimates Chadha’s relevance. Moreover, even he—supersession’s
greatest champion—had to admit that “the fact that a constitutional argument [about
supersession’s invalidity] can be voiced on the basis of Chadha would suggest caution
in the interpretation of the [REA].” Id.
47. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986).
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constitutional norms of lawmaking Chadha reinforces. Chadha is not
without its critics, of course,48 but it is the law.
2. Clinton
If there had been any doubt that Chadha was only about
congressional overreaching, Clinton v. City of New York49 put that view
to rest. Instead, in a case about whether Congress was constitutionally
permitted to allow the President to “cancel” spending items in bills that
had already become law (through bicameralism and presentment), the
Court refused to allow Congress to permit the effective repeal of its
own laws with the mere stroke of a pen by another branch. Focusing
on the language in the relevant Line Item Veto Act (LIVA) that a
cancellation would prevent an otherwise validly-enacted budget
provision “from having legal force or effect,”50 the Court held that
when the President uses his cancellation authority under the statute,
“[i]n both legal and practical effect, the President has amended . . .
Acts of Congress by repealing” portions.51 Quoting Chadha, the Court
emphasized that “repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must
conform with Art[icle] I.”52 And just as “[t]here is no provision in the
Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to
repeal statutes,”53 as the Court announced in Clinton, there is no
provision in the Constitution that allows the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules that amend or repeal statutes, as the REA purports
to permit with respect to the FRE.54 Indeed, the operative language in
the LIVA that led to its constitutional vulnerability is virtually identical
to the REA’s supersession clause as it would apply in connection with
the FRE.55 Thus, although he thought the Court had wrongly decided

48. E.g., E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 515–16 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, Comment, Was There a Baby
in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J.
789, 817–19 (1983); Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law by Any Other
Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 8 (1984).
49. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
50. 2 U.S.C. § 691e(4)(B)–(C) (1994 ed., Supp. V). Does that language sound
familiar?
51. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 437–38.
52. Id. at 438 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983)).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 446 n.40.
55. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 691e(4)(B)–(C) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (providing that a
cancellation prevents a direct spending or tax benefit from “having legal force or
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Clinton, even Sai Prakash had to acknowledge that “[g]iven the logic of
Clinton v. City of New York . . . statutes like . . . the Rules Enabling Act
ought to be considered unconstitutional on Presentment Clause
grounds.”56 The REA—particularly with respect to the FRE, which started as
a congressional statute—is especially vulnerable to Clinton’s reasoning
and its adaptation of Chadha.
In emphasizing that “Congress cannot alter the procedures set out
in Article I, Section 7, without amending the Constitution,”57 the
Clinton Court dropped a footnote of dicta about the REA, trying to
distinguish it. But this footnote of dicta was not much more impressive
than Chadha’s effort to reconcile itself with the REA. Focusing
especially on how supersession of congressional statutes by Supreme
Court rulemaking looks a lot like repeal outside of Article I, Section 7,
the Court had to find some way to excuse it. But what it said below the
line seemed flatly inconsistent with what it said above the line. It
offered that “Congress itself made the decision [in the REA] to repeal
prior rules upon the occurrence of a particular event—here, the
promulgation of procedural rules by this Court.”58 Notice the slick
move here in calling the congressional decision in the REA as one that
effectuates the repeal of “rules” rather than “statutes.” Further, one
cannot help but conclude that what is bad for the goose (of delegating
legislative authority to the President in Clinton) should be bad for the
gander (of delegating legislative authority of repeal to the judiciary in
the REA’s application to the FRE).
The Court tried to analogize the REA to a statute the Court had
upheld in Field v. Clark,59 the Tariff Act of 1890.60 That statute had
created a list of approximately 300 articles that were to be “free” of
import duties “unless otherwise specially provided for in this act.”61
Section 3 of the act then directed the President to suspend the
exemptions for certain items on the list “whenever, and so often” he
determined that any countries were being “reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable.” At which point, the statute directed which duties the
effect”), with 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (providing that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect”).
56. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Deviant Executive Lawmaking, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 42 (1998).
57. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 446.
58. Id. at 446 n.40.
59. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
60. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567.
61. Id.
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President needs to impose during the suspension.62 Thus, although it
is true that the President was given delegated authority to “suspend”
(not “repeal” or “cancel”) tariff exemptions under the statute, it seems
that: (1) the delegation in the 1890 statute had clear, intelligible
conditions for the validity of the suspension authority; (2) imposed an
obligation (a duty!) on the President to suspend statutory exemptions
when he found particular facts; and, finally, (3) also planned
substantively for the suspensions by providing statutorily-delimited
duties for the periods of those suspensions.
Yet, none of these features appear in the REA’s application to the
FRE: Congress gave the Supreme Court no parameters for rules of
evidence law beyond that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right,”63 and that “[a]ny such rule creating,
abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or
effect unless approved by Act of Congress.”64 Writing on a blank slate
without limitation on motivating reasons was a hallmark of legislation
that Chadha required be subject to Article I, Section 7 procedures.
Furthermore, Congress did not impose upon the Supreme Court an
obligation to pursue or revise evidence law under any condition,
whether of desuetude, developing constitutional law, or otherwise.
And, finally, the supersession provision simply requires full repeal of
any statute in conflict with what the Court promulgates, with no other
contingency plan. These features make the REA in connection with
the FRE quite unlike the Tariff Act the Court tried to invoke in its flatfooted footnote 40.65 Indeed, the repeal authority granted in the REA’s
62. Id. at 612.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Since the provision in (a) gives the Court “the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence,” it is not
actually clear that evidence rules must be limited to procedure; they just may not futz
with “any substantive right.” Perhaps they are allowed to create new ones as long as
they do not “abridge, abolish, or modify” others. Id. §§ 2072(a)–(b).
64. Id. § 2074(b).
65. To be fair, the Court discusses a number of other tariff statutes that Field
mentioned. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 444–45 (1998). Those other
statutes more clearly gave the President apparent “repeal” authority—but they were all
constrained by obligations on the President to make specific findings in order to make
the repeals effective. The Court in Clinton also highlighted that the President gets
special deference in matters of foreign trade, see id. at 445 (citing United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)), so it could have tried to
argue—not super-plausibly, mind you, see infra note 191 and text accompanying notes
254–55—that a special competency about evidence (or procedure) in the district
courts inheres in the Supreme Court to justify supersession in the REA. Still, the Court
in Clinton differentiated LIVA from the tariff statutes because LIVA “authorizes the
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application to the FRE is substantially worse from a constitutional
perspective than the cancellation authority in the LIVA: in the LIVA
(and the Tariff Act), the statutory text did not change;66 the same
cannot exactly be said of the FRE as amended through the REA and its
supersession provisions.67 Ultimately, as Justice Kennedy reinforces in
his Clinton concurrence, “[t]hat a congressional cessation of power is
voluntary does not make it innocuous[;] . . . [a]bdication of
responsibility is not part of the constitutional design.”68
To be sure, Clinton has been subject to critical readings by scholars
who think it was wrongly decided69 and those who wish to cabin its
formalistic force to its facts.70 But its formal implications for the REA
in the FRE context are hard to escape.71 Even if, as other members of
the Court believed, Clinton may have really been a non-delegation
President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without
observing the procedures set out in Article I, § 7.” 524 U.S. at 445. It is thus clear that
the REA as applied to the FRE is closer to LIVA than it is to the tariff statutes, whatever
hand waving toward those statutes the Court offered in its footnote. Indeed, the
President’s special competency in managing spending did not ultimately arm the
Court with enough to uphold the constitutionality of the delegation to the President
in the LIVA case; so, the Court’s special competency in evidence (if it even has that—
something we can reasonably doubt) should not be used to bootstrap a bad delegation
of legislative power in the case of the REA as applied to the FRE.
66. Prakash, supra note 56, at 40.
67. To be fair, one could insist that the Public Law never changes through
supersession; such laws are just made inactive (have “no further force or effect”) by
rules that supersede them. I think that counts as a technical repeal, but I can see how
some resistance might come from the formalists here. Still, given how different the
REA/FRE regime is to the regime in the Tariff Act of 1890, I think the Court’s effort
in dicta to defend supersession through Field v. Clark is profoundly underwhelming.
Thanks to Aaron Bruhl for pushing me here.
68. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 452 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 942, n. 13 (1983)).
69. E.g., Prakash, supra note 56, at 4, 42.
70. E.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 315–18 (2013).
71. For arguments that Clinton’s formal requirements have meaningful
implications for how to think about congressional decisions to allow other branches to
repeal its laws, see Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548,
1562, 1564 (2016) (seeming to concede the formal arguments from Clinton but
wanting to use “functional” analysis to permit administrative “forbearances”); and R.
Craig Kitchen, Negative Lawmaking Delegations: Constitutional Structure and Delegations to
the Executive of Discretionary Authority to Amend, Waive, and Cancel Statutory Text, 40
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 570 (2013) (combining formal and functional analysis to
emphasize why such undermining of Article I, Section 7 requirements should not be
permitted).
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decision in disguise,72 focusing instead on non-delegation norms will
not render the REA as applied in the FRE context any less
troublesome, as I now hope to show.73
3. Non-delegation
Both Justices Scalia and Breyer wrote influential opinions in the
Clinton case encouraging the Court (unsuccessfully) to see the statute
at issue in that case as raising non-delegation concerns rather than
presentment concerns under Article 1, Section 7.74 When seen in that
light—especially given the background of the very permissive
delegation regime the Supreme Court affords congressional choices
since the New Deal75—those Justices urged the Court to uphold
Congress’s delegating to another branch responsibility for a kind of
activity it was generally well-positioned to administer effectively, adding
to governance efficiencies.76 But even under a permissive account of
how wide-ranging delegation of lawmaking can be in the modern
administrative state, supersession in connection with the FRE crosses a
line because it allows the Supreme Court to “usurp[] the nondelegable
function of Congress and violates the separation of powers.”77 Given

72. See 524 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at
484 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 2245, 2366 (2001) (“The real question in [Clinton] . . . was whether the power
granted to the President constituted an impermissible delegation.”).
73. Leslie M. Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations of Authority to Cancel
Statutes in the Line Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395,
398–400 (2000), also recognizes the inadequacy of the way the Court sought to
distinguish LIVA from supersession in the REA. But she ultimately thinks supersession
can be defended under some combination of the Supreme Court’s “inherent
authority” to make procedural rules, a non-aggrandizement account of the separation
of powers, and Congress’s limited delegation in the REA that retains its “central role
in the determination of policy.” I’ll take up that set of justifications in Part II.
74. 524 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 484
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“[S]ince 1935, the Court has uniformly rejected nondelegation
arguments and has upheld provisions that authorized agencies to adopt important
rules pursuant to extraordinarily capacious standards.”).
76. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 469 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 478 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a more
ambitious effort to suggest that the entirety of the REA violates the non-delegation
doctrine, see Josh Blackman, Does the Rules Enabling Act Violate the Non-Delegation
Doctrine? (Jan. 28, 2015), https://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/01/28/does-the-
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that the Supreme Court might be poised to revisit some of its nondelegation jurisprudence rendering it somewhat less permissive in the
years to come,78 it is especially urgent to draw attention to the way the
REA inappropriately delegates lawmaking in connection with the FRE.
In this context, it is “inherently defective.”79
To be sure, soon after the Supreme Court was willing to be active in
enforcing a non-delegation doctrine,80 it still held fire against the REA
in its early days. When the original REA was passed in 1934, which did
not obviously delegate the right to make evidence law through
rulemaking, the 1935 non-delegation cases had not yet come down.
But Wayman v. Southard81 had already held in 1825 that Congress may
not transfer “powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative,”82 and
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States83 had already announced the
“intelligible principle” test in 1928, disabling Congress from handing
blanket powers to another branch without giving it some policy
guidance.84 Still, in 1941, the Supreme Court was compliant and
complicit in the delegation to itself in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.85 By 1944,
in Yakus v. United States,86 the Court was already getting less formalistic
about delegations more generally, insisting that the Constitution

rules-enabling-act-violate-the-non-delegation-doctrine
[https://perma.cc/NS7JK748]. My argument here is limited to the REA as it applies to the FRE.
78. See Gundy, 136 S. Ct. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If a majority of this Court
were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would
support that effort.”). Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined Justice
Gorsuch’s effort to revive a non-delegation doctrine with more bite in Gundy. See id.
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Although Kavanaugh did not participate in Gundy, there is
good reason to think he sides with Gorsuch on these matters in light of his solidarity
with Gorsuch in another administrative law case from the same term. See Kisor v.
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2439 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
79. Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act,
and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 1303, 1308 (2006).
80. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 537 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 430 (1935).
81. 10 Wheat. 1 (1825).
82. Id. at 42–43.
83. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
84. Id. at 409. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), had also announced that
“Congress cannot delegate legislative power[,] . . . a principle universally recognized
as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution.” Id. at 692.
85. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
86. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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allows Congress degrees of “flexibility” and “practicality.”87 And in the
1989 Mistretta v. United States88 opinion upholding the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, the Court reinforced the wide latitude Congress has
under the Constitution to delegate to, in that case, a Judicial Branch
instrumentality (though it continued to emphasize the “intelligible
principle” limitation to guide substantial delegations).89 So is anything
left in the flaccid non-delegation doctrine to challenge the REA’s
application to the FRE (which is not controlled by the Court’s decision
in Sibbach about an earlier version of the REA that did not clearly
delegate the power to make and repeal evidence law)?
First, much of the Court’s Sibbach opinion focuses on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure made under the REA being quite narrowly
“procedural” rather than “substantive.”90 This character of the Federal
Rules at issue in the case is part of the justificatory matrix for
upholding the delegation. Indeed, the Court emphasized that
Congress “has never essayed to declare the substantive state law, or to
abolish or nullify a right recognized by the substantive law of the state
where the cause of action arose, save where a right or duty is imposed
in a field committed to Congress by the Constitution.”91 Thus, even if
John Hart Ely was right that the Sibbach Court underemphasized or
misunderstood the feature in the REA that no Federal Rule may
“abridge, enlarge, []or modify the substantive right of any litigant”92
(which might have led to a different result if the relevant state actually
protected the litigant from the physical exam ordered under the
Federal Rules in the district court in the case),93 there is no question
that the Court’s willingness to go along with the delegation was tied up

87. Id. at 425–26.
88. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
89. Id. at 372.
90. Sibbach, 321 U.S. at 10, 14.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 718–20 (1974). Note that “of any litigant”
disappeared in the modern version of the REA, highlighting that the relevant
substantive rights may be more conceptual or related to third parties rather than
possessory to specific litigants.
93. See Ely, supra note 92 (discussing the facts and holding in Sibbach). Not
everyone agrees with Ely. See generally Burbank, supra note 23, at 1152 (arguing that
this dimension of the REA was really intended to be a mirror of the first requirement
that the Court promulgate general rules of procedure and was not an additional sideconstraint).
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with its view about the “procedural” nature of the relevant Federal
Rules.
Yet, even if one were to concede that much of the FRE is sufficiently
“procedural” and focused on internal housekeeping in the federal
courts as a general matter,94 it would be hard not to conclude that
central issues to the FRE like how to think about character evidence,
how to evaluate religious convictions or belief, and burdens of proof
and presumptions for tort causes of action are “right[s] granted for
one or more nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes
not having to do with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation
process,”95 or some purpose extrinsic to the evaluation of evidence.
Thus, with respect to the FRE, there may be so much in it that is
susceptible to abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive rights
that it requires revisiting the soundness of Sibbach’s complacency about
the delegation in the REA as it applies to the FRE.96 Whether one
thinks much of the FRE should be invalidated because it fails to comply
with the REA’s statutory requirement of not abridging, enlarging, or
modifying substantive rights or whether one focuses on the centrality
of that limitation to render the delegation constitutional in the first
place, the FRE puts Sibbach’s blessing of the delegation effectuated in
the REA-as-of-1934 against the ropes as a way to justify our current REAFRE interface.
Second, Sibbach relied to some extent on a congressional review
process in the original REA that is no longer permitted under Chadha.
The Court held in Sibbach that after the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were proposed and submitted to Congress under the REA,

94. See Edmund M. Morgan, Rules of Evidence—Substantive or Procedural, 10 VAND. L.
REV. 467, 468 (1957) (arguing that evidence law is procedural, through and through).
For the classic typologies of which parts of evidence law are truly procedural and which
are harder to classify as such, see Jack B. Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma
Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 356 (1969); and
Ronan E. Degnan, The Law of Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275, 283 (1962).
95. Ely, supra note 93, at 725.
96. This is part of why Ely could have written in 1974, as follows: “Thus, in one
slight sense it seems a pity that Congress intercepted the Evidence Rules. For the
privilege provisions might well have presented the case that forced the Court to get
serious about the Enabling Act.” Id. at 738. For him, it is clear that “[a] Federal Rule
displacing [the husband-wife or physician-patient] . . . privilege would . . . violate the
[REA’s] second sentence” about abridging substantive rights. Id. at 740. Although
Congress moved privilege issues out of contention by requiring that they be regulated
by statute, id., many other FRE provisions affect substantive rights in similar ways but
are still subject to the REA regime under current law.
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“that body might examine them and veto their going into effect if
contrary to the policy of the legislature.”97 Focusing on the “value of
the reservation” to vindicate the delegation (the “report-and-wait”
dimension of the REA), the Sibbach Court used what looked to it in
1941 as a legislative veto provision in the original REA to find “no
transgression of legislative policy,” further vindicating the delegation.98
Although Justice Frankfurter’s dissent on this point seems right—that
“to draw any inference of tacit approval from non-action by Congress
is to appeal to unreality”99—the legislative veto provision in the REA is
no longer a part of it, because Congress got rid of that form of review
in 1988, after Chadha.100 Thus, whatever relief that provision provided
the Sibbach Court in upholding the delegation in 1941—as Congress
could efficiently and quickly makes sure its policy preferences were
being followed by the Court—was eroded by Chadha’s rendering all
legislative vetoes unconstitutional.101
Third, and finally, the original version of the REA contemplated an
all-at-once replacement of the procedural rules under the Conformity
Act with the Federal Rules to come on the heels of the REA’s passage.
The idea that the supersession provision in 1934 would have allowed
the Supreme Court to supersede the Conformity Act in 1938 (with a
potential that Congress might then systematically repeal statutes in
conflict with the new Federal Rules after the dust settled from the
passage of the Rules) and then in an ongoing way supersede its own
Federal Rules with amendments and repeals of earlier versions of its
Federal Rules is about as far as one can read the finding of a
constitutional delegation in Sibbach, which we have to treat as the
standing law. But that is a long way off from the modern modality of
supersession in connection with the FRE, which has permitted the
Supreme Court in an ongoing way for 45 years to amend and repeal
virtually willy-nilly congressional statutes that were enacted through
the constitutional procedures of bicameralism and presentment. The
Foreword of the FRE should give any student of constitutional law
97. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 15–16.
99. Id. at 18 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
100. See Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4650 (1988) (removing the one-house
legislative veto provision from the REA).
101. I discussed this feature of Chadha above. Supra text accompanying note 40. The
Court willfully forgot in 1983 what it knew in 1941: that the original REA probably
contained a legislative veto. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935 n.9 (1983) (discussing
the “report-and-wait” provision the Court considered in Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 15).

2022] ARE THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 931
pause: “This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence . . . .
The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2,
1975) and have been amended by Acts of Congress, and further amended
by the United States Supreme Court.”102 This is pretty wild stuff. Indeed,
since Congress cannot countermand proposals to upend its statutes in
any fast-tracked way (as it could have under the pre-Chadha REA), what
we have now is closer to what was unimaginable even in Mistretta. It is
as if Congress gave the Sentencing Commission the authority not only
to set determinate sentencing guidelines for crimes set by Congress (as
the Court blessed in Mistretta103) but also the power to amend and
repeal substantive criminal law statutes on an ongoing basis, reserving
for itself only the ability to countermand that Commission by going
through the constitutional mechanisms of bicameralism and
presentment. Even in 1989, when the Court was being pretty mushy
about delegations to the Judicial Branch, the Court would not have
gone along with such congressional abdication of its own lawmaking
and law-repealing authority.
In short, and perhaps surprisingly for such a seemingly toothless
framework, the non-delegation doctrine exposes the formal failures of
the REA as applied to the FRE. Rather than “an empty exercise in
judicial rhetoric,”104 the non-delegation doctrine should be seen to
proscribe how the REA functions in connection with the FRE.105 To the
extent that the doctrine tends to recede in the standard vanilla
delegation to Article II administrative agencies, courts can rely on
Article III judicial review as a backstop, thanks to the Administrative

102. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., FED. RULES OF EVIDENCE III
(Comm. Print 2019) (emphasis added).
103. 488 U.S. 361, 369, 379 (1989).
104. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 480 (1989).
105. I would have to concede that even Gorsuch in Section II.B of his Gundy dissent
looking to revive the non-delegation doctrine cites Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1
(1825), in service of his willingness to assume that courts have some constitutional
grant to regulate their own practices. See Gundy v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2116, 2136
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1,
31, 43 (1825)). This ostensibly lessens his worry about certain kinds of delegations to
the judiciary. As I’ll suggest more carefully below, much of evidence law is not mere
regulation of courtroom practices but is instead substantive law implicating federalism
and jury rights—and in any event the delegation of interest here is not the delegation
to make rules for how to admit impeachment testimony, for example, but the
delegation effectively to repeal statutes, a wholly different kind of delegation of
legislative authority.
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Procedure Act.106 To the extent the doctrine fades away in many
delegations to the President directly, the Court can—as Justice Breyer
emphasizes in Clinton107—rely on the political process somewhat as a
backstop. But in connection with a delegation to the Supreme Court,
which is ultimately asked to sit in judgment on the reach of its own
power and be the judges in their own cause, it is easier to see how the
non-delegation doctrine can do some real work here.108 It is, from this
vantage point, not hard to understand why the Court has never struck
down part of the FRE for being beyond the authorization in the REA.109
It is thus a little ridiculous (or “unseemly”)110 to think that the part of
the REA that could be used to invalidate Federal Rules that infringe
on substantive rights can be the thin reed on which to vindicate the
constitutionality of supersession.111
106. Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946).
107. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 490 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
108. As Andrew Kent observes to his constitutional law students every year, the
Court is routinely unconcerned with separation of powers deviations in favor of
judicial power. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (permitting
broad policymaking in the Judicial Branch’s Sentencing Commission); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 (1988) (permitting the Judicial Branch to appoint an
independent counsel as a prosecutorial officer to investigate the Executive Branch);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 685, 713 (1974) (upholding a Judicial Branch
subpoena against an assertion by the President of “executive privilege”); Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (upholding a broad delegation to the Supreme
Court).
Perhaps a formalist argument could be run as follows: It is actually the law that
the Court is unconcerned with delegations to the judicial branch. Whether formally
the law or practically the law, the Court will never strike down a delegation to itself.
About this form of formalism, I can say two things: 1. I am about to offer a functionalist
reason to be skeptical of such an argument; and 2. mutatis mutandis, res ipsa loquitur.
109. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 379 (holding that Congress’s broad delegation to the
Judicial Sentencing Commission is permissible); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 713 (ruling in favor
of judicial power over executive privilege).
110. Kelleher, supra note 73, at 443. For a trenchant critique about how the
rulemaking process is a classic “foxes-watching-the-henhouse” problem, see Carrie
Leonetti, Watching the Hen House: Judicial Rulemaking and Judicial Review, 91 NEB. L. REV.
72 (2012).
111. For one effort in this regard, notwithstanding an appreciation of this problem,
see Kelleher, supra note 73, at 441 (“The failure by the Court to take seriously the limits
on its authority to promulgate Rules could create a problem with the supersession
provision.”). Kelleher also dismisses the worry about judges being the adjudicators of
their own authority—the most basic nemo judex in sua causa principle of natural justice,
see Fred H. Blume, Book Three Title Five in Annotated Justinian Code,
http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/_files/docs/Book-3PDF/Book%2035.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PJL-Y7ZG]—because the Court merely “rubberstamps” the
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B. Function
The formal arguments against the constitutionality of the FRE’s
revision and amendment system are formidable. They are reason
enough—even apart from the continuing ascendency of formalism on
Supreme Court112—to look for a better future for the FRE, putting it
on firmer constitutional foundations. But there are also functional
arguments that reinforce the conclusion that something structural has
to change for the FRE rulemaking process, which I explore below.
Although my formal arguments may have broader application for the
way supersession in the REA also affects other federal rules regimes,
the functional arguments I offer are targeted to its application in the
FRE context, upon which I focus here.
1. Why evidence is special—like bankruptcy
Consider Congress’s choice to repeal supersession for the
Bankruptcy Rules in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.113 The Senate
Report notes the following: “This bill extensively revises the
bankruptcy law. Nearly all procedural matters have been removed and
left to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Consequently, the need to
permit the Supreme Court’s rules to supersede the statute no longer
exists. To the extent a rule is inconsistent the statute will govern.”114
And when one looks closely at 28 U.S.C. § 2075—the REA’s provisions
that deal with the Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate rules for
bankruptcy proceedings—the absence of a parallel supersession

work of an Advisory Committee and Judicial Conference and “actually plays very little
role in the rulemaking process.” Kelleher, supra note 73, at 443. This is supposed to
make us more comfortable with the REA’s delegation to the Supreme Court to amend
and repeal statutory law that regularly touches upon substantive rights? To the extent
the delegation is a pass-through to the Advisory Committee, we inch ever closer to the
problems associated with the delegation in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States
in which a “roving commission” of private parties got to promulgate rules that affected
substantive rights. 295 U.S. 495, 521–25 (1935); id. at 551 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
112. See Ofer Raban, Between Formalism and Conservatism: The Resurgent Legal
Formalism of the Roberts Court, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 343, 344–45 (2014) (documenting
the increase in formalistic decisions during the Roberts Court era).
113. Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s “Substance”
and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1045.
114. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1978); see also H.R. Rep. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 292 (1977) (“[T]he Rules would no longer create confusion if
they are inconsistent with the statute, and the Supreme Court will lose the power to
repeal pro tanto portions of the bankruptcy laws.”). Thanks to Stephen Burbank for
these references.
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provision is as salient as it is instructive.115 Indeed, it mostly mimics the
authorizations and procedures for promulgating rules of procedure
and evidence in § 2072 and § 2074 with that one notable omission.116
As Stephen Burbank notes, it is hard to understand why Congress’s
logic in 1978 did not generalize to the whole Federal Rules regime by
1988, when it was revisiting the REA anyway.117
As I’ve already discussed, unlike the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the FRE was first set in motion by Congress rather than the
Supreme Court. Congress set into codified form statutory law that
grants and limits many substantive rights that pre-empt local state
law—just like substantive bankruptcy law. Thus, Congress should have
rendered all substantive rules of evidence immune from
supersession—and allowed the Court to promulgate only more purely
procedural evidence guidelines. It appreciated this enough to disable
the Supreme Court from in any way mucking with evidentiary
privileges,118 but missed its opportunity like it had with the bankruptcy
overhaul to separate more clearly congressionally determined
substantive rights in the laws of evidence from procedural ones that it
could leave wholly in control of the Supreme Court both in the first
instance and beyond, rendering supersession of congressional laws as
unnecessary as it is unconstitutional.
What Congress should have done in 1988 was repeal all parts of the
FRE that it thought purely procedural, leaving their status as “Rules”
untouched even though they would no longer be statutes of the United
States. It could then leave much of the FRE in the hands of the Advisory
Committee and the Supreme Court without the awkwardness of the
FRE being a statute. And once the rules that grant substantive rights
remained codified, Congress should have repealed the supersession
provision so it would be clear that statutes trump promulgated rules—
business as usual, of course, in the rest of the administrative state.119

115. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075.
116. Id.; id. § 2074(a); id. § 2072(b).
117. Burbank, supra note 113, at 1045.
118. “Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall
have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.” Id. § 2074(b). Admittedly,
in practice this has led the Court to develop evidentiary privileges through the
common law rather than through the rulemaking process. Whatever defects such
developments create, at least the developments require actual cases and controversies
and judicial reasoning—something absent in the rulemaking process.
119. Consider APA provision 5 U.S.C. § 706 (requiring that reviewing courts “shall
. . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
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To be sure, in light of the specialized treatment of bankruptcy in the
REA, one could conclude that Congress seems to have made a
deliberate choice in 1988 to sustain supersession for the FRE (a
decision I am arguing is beyond its formal authority). Yet, one cannot
escape the conclusion that several parts of the FRE ought to be outside
the ambit of supersession because they are congressional policy
choices that should not be so easily upset or undone by a mere rule
pursuant to a delegation with no discernable standard. For example,
putting to one side the controversy surrounding FRE Rules 413, 414,
and 415120—rules permitting the admission of evidence that a
defendant committed a previous similar crime of sexual assault or
child molestation—which were added to the FRE by Congress through
a 1994 statutory enactment,121 it is hard not to see them as policy
choices that should be outside the REA revision process. Yet
notwithstanding that Congress expressed an intent for these FRE
provisions to be immunized from supersession (at least in the first
instance),122 the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court went
ahead and amended—and superseded—them anyway through the
REA process in 2011.123
Or consider three more FRE rules that were passed in Congress’s
original 1975 enactment: Rule 411 explains how evidence of liability
insurance should not figure in proving negligence or wrongful
be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations” or “otherwise not in
accordance with [statutory] law”).
120. See, e.g., R. Wade King, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: By
Answering the Public’s Call for Increased Protection from Sexual Predators, Did Congress Move
Too Far Toward Encouraging Conviction Based on Character Rather than Guilt?, 33 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2002) (arguing that Rules 413 and 414 created an increased
risk of wrongful conviction).
121. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135–37 (1994) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. app. Fed. R. Evid. 413–15 (1994)).
122. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 2137 (“Not later than 150 days after the date of enactment of this Act . . . ,
the Judicial Conference of the United States shall transmit to Congress a report
containing recommendations for amending the Federal Rules of Evidence as they
affect the admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual assault or child
molestation crimes in cases involving sexual assault and child molestation. The Rules
Enabling Act shall not apply to the recommendations made by the Judicial Conference
pursuant to this section.”).
123. See Elizabeth L. DeCoux, Are the 2011 Changes to Federal Rules of Evidence 413–
415 Invalid? The Rules Enabling Act and the Drafters’ Definition of “Stylistic”, 34 N.C. CENT.
L. REV. 136, 136 (2012). Merely stylistic or not, the Supreme Court rewrote a
congressional law.
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conduct but may figure in proving a witness’s bias, prejudice, agency,
ownership, or control.124 Rule 610 establishes that “[e]vidence of a
witness’s religious beliefs or opinions is not admissible to attack or
support the witness’s credibility.”125 And Rule 608, in part, provides
that, “By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any
privilege against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to
the witness’s character for truthfulness.”126 These congressional
commitments—to forms of proof in tort law and to constitutional
principles associated with the freedom of religion and the right against
self-incrimination—should not so easily be subject to amendment or
repeal through the REA process, whatever else Congress intended
within the REA. The delegation of repeal authority away from
Congress should be seen as an abdication that our Constitution should
not permit: Congress must remain the core lawmaker in these
domains, subject to Article III judicial review where appropriate in a
case or controversy. Even though the Supreme Court has not
substantively or substantially yet used its authority to completely undo
these particular congressional choices made in 1975,127 the Court has
used its REA authority in connection with each of these rules and
replaced its wording for Congress’s.128 That just is not how important
lawmaking should work—and it confuses the task of statutory
interpretation, leaving courts interpreting their own work product
rather than a congressional enactment. And nothing in the current
REA adequately protects these provisions from repeal because
Congress cannot countermand the Supreme Court without passing a
new law with House and Senate majorities, along with presidential
approval.129
Even fans of supersession generally recognize that
the congressional choice to enact legislation indicates a policy
decision, which presumptively places the matter into the area of

124. Fed. R. Evid. 411.
125. Fed. R. Evid. 610.
126. Fed. R. Evid. 608.
127. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., FED. RULES OF EVIDENCE
11–12 (Comm. Print 2019) (demonstrating that subsequent Supreme Court
amendments did not change these congressional choices).
128. Rule 411 was amended with the REA process on Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Oct. 1, 1987
and Apr. 26, 2011, eff. Dec. 1, 2011. Fed R. Evid. 411. Rule 610 was amended with the
REA process on both of these dates as well. Fed. R. Evid. 610. And Rule 608 was
amended on the 2011 date, as well as dates in 1987, 1988, and 2003. Fed. R. Evid. 608.
129. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
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“substantive rights,” and outside of the scope of matters delegated to
the Court. Thus, statutes with a substantive purpose . . . are not
subject to supersession, as a Court-promulgated Rule in conflict with
the statute would impermissibly affect a substantive right within the
meaning of the REA.130

In light of how much of the FRE is shot through with allocations of
substantive rights, it would be better to parcel out the purely
procedural and internal housekeeping provisions, render the latter
exclusively rule-based and not statute-based through a repeal, re-enact
the portions of the FRE that grant substantive rights of litigants, and
repeal the parts of the REA that grant the Supreme Court the ability
to supersede statutes, which has no place in the fabric of our laws.
2. Federalism
In Stephen Burbank’s authoritative study about the origins of the
original REA in 1934, he argued that the baked-in REA condition that
rulemaking not bump up against “substantive right” was not really
about federalism.131 To be sure, from a contemporary Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins132 perspective (and Erie would not be decided for another
four years after the passage of the REA), the REA’s permission to the
Court to make rules of “procedure” looks like a “protection of
‘substantive’ state policies” with “roots in federalism concerns.”133 Yet,
Burbank’s careful history of the REA’s adoption furnishes the
following conclusion: “It is difficult to find even a trace of concern that
the uniform federal procedure bill [that became the REA] might lead
to an inappropriate displacement of state law in any of the reports and
other material produced by its ABA sponsors during the long
campaign” to adopt the REA.134 Rather, what the REA was really about
was an allocation of powers between coordinate branches of
government: procedure for the Court; substantive rights for Congress.
The REA is a separation of powers statute, not a federalism statute.135

130. Kelleher, supra note 73, at 442.
131. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1108–12.
132. 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938).
133. Burbank, supra note 23, at 1108–09.
134. Id. at 1111.
135. Id. at 1111 n.435. As we just saw above, the FRE rulemaking regime is not
faithful to this “original intent” for the REA because the Court is getting plenty of
control over substantive right through Congress’s broad delegation. Hoping the Court
will use its review powers (and its statutory limit against promulgating rules that upset
substantive rights) to reign in its own authority seems to be a form of magical thinking.
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All that said, from a post-Erie perspective, we simply have to apply the
REA with federalism concerns in mind. Erie requires maintaining state
sovereign control over state substantive law as part of the law of our
federal courts. Second, whatever allocation of powers was first
envisioned by the REA in 1934, 1975 gave us a different REA (to say
nothing of the 1988 REA)—and an FRE that had more obvious
potential to intersect with state substantive rights.136 When those FRE
rules are formal statutes of the United States, it is not controversial that
federal law prevails over state law when Congress so intends (assuming
Congress is acting within its constitutional jurisdiction), owing to
settled views about preemption under the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause.137
Indeed, it was not a great mystery why Congress countermanded the
Supreme Court’s proposal for the FRE in 1973: in meaningful part, the
congressional record reveals a Congress worried directly about the
federalism implications of the FRE (and particularly the way its
privilege law would infringe state sovereignty).138 Although it coped
with its federalism anxieties by enacting the FRE itself and reserving
the right to amend the privilege rules,139 this compromise produced
some other difficulties Congress did not fully appreciate at the time,
especially owing to developments in constitutional law (and common
law developments in privilege law that would not come through the
REA process). To wit, the Supreme Court’s supersession mechanisms
for amendment and repeal that Congress approved in 1975 created a
deep problem for American federalism. Those Court-made rules can
too easily displace state substantive law without a congressional intent
to preempt and with too loose oversight about which FRE rules are
genuinely procedural and should be applied in diversity cases. Such
Court-made rules should give way to state substantive policies that

136. Kelleher, supra note 73, at 399, 444.
137. U.S. CONST. art VI.
138. See 119 CONG. REC., 8331–37 (1973) (worrying about how the FRE involve
“delicate questions of Federal-State relations” and “abridge many important existing
substantive rights of federal court litigants, thus violating principles or federalism”).
For more analysis of these issues, see Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of
Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1781–85 (1994);
Charles H. Anderton, Jr., Comment, The Constitutional and Erie Implications for Federal
Diversity Cases of the Privilege Provisions of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 8 LINCOLN
L. REV. 151, 151–53 (1973); Martin I. Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Civil
Litigation, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 923, 923–24 (1975).
139. Dudley, supra note 138, at 1781–84.
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cannot be so easily displaced under Erie.140 To a Congress in 1975 that
was allowed to reserve to itself a one-house legislative veto—and
approved one specifically with respect to the FRE—it might have
worried less. In a world without legislative vetoes post-Chadha, it must
worry more. The entire legislative deal for the FRE might have been
wrapped up with a one-house veto provision that is no longer
constitutionally viable.
Rather than re-hashing the privilege issues—which are not really
subject to the REA anyway, as Congress saw fit to exclude such a central
federalism issue from the REA process141—consider, instead, Rule
407.142 This rule—as passed by Congress in 1975—controls the
admissibility of “subsequent remedial measures” a party might take,
holding them inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct.143
Neither in 1975 was there nor today is there any reference to relevant
state laws on this kind of evidence in state tort cases; references back
to state law do, however, appear, in current Rule 302144 on civil
presumptions, Rule 501145 on privileges, and Rule 601146 on
competency.147 Yet notwithstanding that many states continue to have
different substantive positions on how subsequent remedial measures
should figure in state product liability law,148 at least since Rule 407 was
clarified by Supreme Court amendment in 1997 to apply to product
liability cases149 when those cases come before federal courts sitting in
140. See generally Olin Guy Wellborn III, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Application of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371 (1977).
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (“Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an
evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of
Congress.”).
142. Fed. R. Evid. 407.
143. Fed. R. Evid. 407, as passed in 1975.
144. Fed. R. Evid. 302 (“In a civil case, state law governs the effect of a presumption
regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.”).
145. Fed. R. Evid. 501 (“But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a
claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.”).
146. Fed. R. Evid. 601 (“But in a civil case, state law governs the witness’s
competency regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of
decision.”).
147. 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 4:55
(4th ed. 2019) (“The Erie Problem”).
148. Id.
149. The Supreme Court was endorsing the Advisory Committee’s decision from
1993 on the matter. See Minutes of the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Evid. 3–4
(1993) (recognizing a circuit split on applying state substantive law to products liability
cases).
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diversity, federal courts are generally applying the FRE policy rather
than state substantive law on remedial measures. The Supreme Court
intervened with an FRE amendment to Rule 407 in 1997 precisely
because some courts (and commentators) were taking Erie seriously
and applying state substantive law in products liability cases when
sitting in diversity.150
For fans of a uniform evidence law in the federal courts, maybe they
do not see anything funky here. In the earlier version of Rule 407,
there was some ambiguity about whether it effectively preempted state
substantive law on the point; Congress’s intent was not clear on the
matter.151 But after having this issue percolate in the lower courts from
1975 to 1997, the “rule maker” clarified how to resolve the question
prospectively.152
Yet there is something amiss in this process because Rule 407 was a
congressional statute—and the Supreme Court rewrote the law in
substantive ways that have substantial federalism implications.
Preemption of state law based on congressional silence to a Supreme
Court rulemaking order does not seem like the best way to respect our
federalism. True enough, the Supreme Court—through a case or
controversy—ultimately would be able to determine the preemptive
150. 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 147, at § 4:55. For some background on
this dispute in the lead-up to the 1997 amendments, see, for example, Marcia Lyn
Finkelstein, Note, Comity and Tragedy: The Case of Rule 407, 38 VAND. L. REV. 585 (1985)
(focusing on Maine Rule of Evidence 407, which self-consciously departed from
Federal Rule of Evidence 407, and arguing that it should not be preempted); Douglas
McKeige, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 407: Can It Override Conflicting State Law?, 59
TUL. L. REV. 1577 (1985) (arguing for state law to prevail over federal law); Lev Dassin,
Note, Design Defects in the Rules Enabling Act: The Misapplication of Federal Rule of Evidence
407 to Strict Liability, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 736 (1990) (arguing that state law should
control). These papers were motivated, in part, by the 10th Circuit’s decision to give
effect to state substantive law over Rule 407. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet
Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that “state rule controls” when
conflicts between Rule 407 and the Maine rule arise). But see Flaminio v. Honda Motor
Co., 733 F.2d 463, 472 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying Rule 407 against a claim that state
products liability law should control). Once the Supreme Court promulgated its new
version of Rule 407 in 1997, however, it was much harder to sustain the idea that state
law should control; and courts have largely fallen into line. See Evan Stephenson, Alone
and Out of Excuses: The Tenth Circuit’s Refusal to Apply Federal Rule of Evidence 407 to Product
Liability Actions, 36 N.M. L. REV. 391, 417 (2006) (encouraging the 10th Circuit to get
into line after the 1997 amendments); 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 147, at
§ 4:55 (noting case development and embracing the consensus conclusion that Rule
407 now clearly controls state law).
151. 2 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 147, at § 4:55.
152. Id.
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effects of Rule 407. But that decision would be in the context of an act
of statutory interpretation and would therefore have to draw on
Congress’s intent through the traditional tools of statutory
construction, wrestling with a host of presumptions against federal
preemption of traditional state regulation (which most tort law
obviously is),153 and a strong rule against federal invasion of core state
functions.154 There is good reason to be skeptical that fundamental
decisions of the preemption of substantive state law ought to be
disposed of by unilateral rulemaking unconstrained by the
Administrative Procedure Act that can supersede a congressional law
on the matter.155 And let’s not forget that when those rulemaking
decisions are challenged through the courts, none other than the rule
maker itself performs the requisite judicial review.156

153. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (holding that federal law does
not preempt state law in failure-to-warn claims); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 232, 237 (1947) (finding that state law historically regulated warehousemen
and Congress did not express intent to adopt new policy that would preempt
warehousemen state law).
154. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–64 (1991).
155. Obviously, administrative agencies sometimes get a bit of control over
preemption decisions. See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865,
886 (2000). If one took the Court in its rulemaking function to be an administrative
agency acting pursuant to delegated authority for some purposes, one might not be so
troubled with the Court promulgating rules to clarify the preemption status of some
of the FRE. But remember that these agency determinations of preemption can usually
be reviewed by the courts, an independent branch, in some way. Judicial review just
cannot be taken seriously if the Court were tasked with reviewing its own rulemaking
work. Nor is the Supreme Court itself bound by the procedural requirements for
rulemaking in the Administrative Procedure Act, which might contribute to rule
legitimation.
156. Kelleher, supra note 73, at 398, 413.
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I could offer other examples here157 but I think the point is clear158:
the FRE take positions that have serious implications for balancing
state and federal interests in matters of substantive law.159 For the FRE
rules that interfere with state substantive law, Congress—or,
alternatively, the Court in its Article III “case-or-controversy” posture—
needs to be making the decisions about preemption of state law, not
the Supreme Court as rule maker without a real compass from
Congress.

157. Consider, as another example, Rule 702. See, for example, Michael H.
Gottesman, Should Federal Evidence Rules Trump State Tort Policy? The Federalism Values
Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1872–73 (1994). Or Rule 408. See Carota v.
Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448, 451 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming a district court’s
refusal to apply the federal rule disallowing settlement negotiations to go to the jury
because controlling state law permitted it and that substantive state policy should not
be displaced by the FRE). One might also look to the way states handle impeachment
of witnesses on the basis of crimes of “moral turpitude,” language that does not appear
in Rule 609 but does remain in state codes of evidence. For more on the federal-state
interaction on this issue, see Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV.
1001, 1025–39 (exploring how the federal statute in 1975 departed from state codes
on impeachment, many of which ended up mirroring the federal approach, but
identifying Texas and California as holdouts).
158. Imagine that tomorrow the Supreme Court promulgates a parol evidence rule
for federal courts sitting in diversity cases and Congress does not generate sufficient
mobilization to countermand by statute. No one contests that the parol evidence is a
substantive rather than procedural rule for Erie purposes, nor that different states
choose different approaches to it. And it would be hard to argue that it would be
beyond Congress’s institutional authority to enact a federal parol evidence rule—or
delegate the authority to do so, though admittedly both of these propositions are
contestable. Yet, in light of the widespread deference the FRE get thanks to Hanna,
and thanks to the thinness of the “substantive right” limitation that never gets invoked
to invalidate rules, it seems very likely that many federal courts would start ignoring
substantive state contract law in diversity cases and adhere to an FRE parol evidence
rule. That trenches on the federalism in the way Erie should have helped us avoid.
159. The Supreme Court understood early how tied up evidence law was with
substantive state rights. Consider M’Niel v. Holbrook, 37 U.S. 84, 89 (1838):
We do not [perceive] any sufficient reason . . . to exclude . . . those statutes of
the several states which prescribe rules of evidence, in civil cases, in trials at
common law. Indeed, it would be difficult to [make] the laws of the state, in
relation to the rights of property, the rule of decision in the circuit courts;
without associating with them the laws of the same state, prescribing the rules
of evidence by which the rights of property must be decided. How could the
courts of the United States decide whether property had been legally
transferred, unless they resorted to the laws of the state to ascertain by what
evidence the transfer must be established?
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3. The jury
There is yet a third functional reason to worry about the way the REA
and FRE interact in our current rulemaking regime, reinforcing the
formal arguments against supersession and the Supreme Court’s
delegated power to amend and repeal laws of evidence. That is the
deep way evidence rules implicate the constitutional rights to a jury,
guaranteed in Article III and the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.160
Although there are undoubtedly important ways constitutional jury
rights can be implicated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure161 and
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,162 rules of evidence so
fundamentally control what end up as questions of law for courts and
what juries are permitted to see that they might have a special
constitutional status connected to jury rights as a whole. Indeed, many
who do comparative work distinguish systems that use juries from civil
160. U.S. CONST. art. III (“Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by Jury . . . “); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . “); U.S. CONST. amend. VII
(“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law.”).
161. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. PR. 38 (“The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to
the parties inviolate.”); FED. R. CIV. PR. 39(c) (“In an action not triable of right by a
jury, the court, on motion or on its own: (1) may try any issue with an advisory jury; or
(2) may, with the parties’ consent, try any issue by a jury whose verdict has the same
effect as if a jury trial had been a matter of right, unless the action is against the United
States and a federal statute provides for a nonjury trial.”); FED. R. CIV. PR. 48
(“(a) NUMBER OF JURORS. A jury must begin with at least 6 and no more than 12
members, and each juror must participate in the verdict unless excused under Rule
47(c). (b) VERDICT. Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the verdict must be
unanimous and must be returned by a jury of at least 6 members. (c) POLLING. After a
verdict is returned but before the jury is discharged, the court must on a party’s
request, or may on its own, poll the jurors individually. If the poll reveals a lack of
unanimity or lack of assent by the number of jurors that the parties stipulated to, the
court may direct the jury to deliberate further or may order a new trial.”). Suja Thomas
has also famously argued that the recognition of summary judgment in Rule 56 runs
afoul of the rights to a jury, too. See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 139–40, 179–80 (2007).
162. See FED. R. CRIM. PR. 23 (“Jury or Nonjury Trial”); FED. R. CRIM. PR. 24 (“Trial
Jurors”); FED. R. CRIM. PR. 30 (“Jury Instructions”); FED. R. CRIM. PR. 31 (“Jury
Verdict”). The Constitution’s Fifth Amendment grand jury right is implicated in Rule
6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure—but I am leaving the grand jury right
aside here, for the moment.
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law jurisdictions that do not in part by highlighting that evidence rules
are far more developed in the common law countries that need to
worry about what a jury might see.163 It is, thus, not just Rule 1008 about
“Functions of the Court and Jury” in the FRE that provides meaningful
specifications of the constitutional jury rights,164 but it is many other
corners of the FRE, as well.165 This feature of the FRE makes it an
especially poor candidate for supersession by unilateral rule of the
Supreme Court (with countermanding permissible only through
another enactment consistent with Article I, Section 7 requirements).
To see how thoroughly suffused with jury matters the FRE are,
consider Rules 103 and 104, to start: Rule 103 instructs, “To the extent
practicable, the court must conduct a jury trial so that inadmissible
evidence is not suggested to the jury by any means.”166 This reinforces
that virtually every admissibility decision implicates what a jury is
allowed to hear. Further, Rule 104 controls “preliminary questions”
about admissibility, witness qualification, and the availability of
privilege, all of which are supposed to be adjudicated outside the
earshot of the jury (with a few listed exceptions).167 Furthermore, Rules
105 and 201 both pertain to how a judge is supposed to instruct jurors

163. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 180 (1898) (“[T]he greatest and most remarkable offshoot of the jury
was that body of excluding rules which chiefly constitute the English ‘Law of
Evidence.’”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Bifurcation and the Law of Evidence, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 134, 134–37 (2006) (“That the law of evidence is the child of the jury
system is not only oft-repeated but also, as a historical matter, probably true.”). For
some discussion—and rejection—of the dichotomy between common law jurisdictions
with meticulous evidence rules and civil law jurisdictions which allow “free proof,” see,
for example, Karl H. Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence
Rules Under the Common Law System and the Civil Law System of “Free Proof” in the German
Code of Criminal Procedure, 16 BUFF. L. REV. 122, 122–23, 163–64 (1966). And for more
skepticism about the conventional wisdom that we can do away with evidence rules in
cases without juries and that most evidence law is a form of jury control, see Fredrick
Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 165–68
(2006); and Lisa Dufraimont, Evidence Law and the Jury: A Reassessment, 53 MCGILL L.J.
199, 209–10, 238 (2008).
I do not need to rely on any categorical claim about the centrality of juries to evidence
law to observe that the FRE we have in the United States often and thoroughly enforces
a division of labor between jury and judge—and in so doing significantly contours our
constitutional rights to a jury.
164. Fed. R. Evid. 1008.
165. E.g., Schauer, supra note 163, at 195 (hearsay rules).
166. Fed. R. Evid. 103(d).
167. Fed. R. Evid. 104.
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about the evidence she does admit.168 Rule 403 allows judges to exclude
relevant evidence if the judge is convinced its “probative value” would
be “substantially outweighed by,” among other things, “misleading the
jury.”169 Rule 606, beyond taking the reasonable position that jurors
should not be trial witnesses, also tightly controls what jurors may
reveal about deliberations during an inquiry into the validity of a
verdict, a question of constitutional magnitude about the privacy of
jury deliberations.170 Rule 703 provides guidance on what may be
disclosed to the jury in connection with an expert’s opinion
testimony.171 Although these specific examples are just the most
explicit, rules on relevance (Rules 400–14), witnesses (Rules 601–15),
and hearsay (Rules 801–07) also have implications for the reach and
scope of the jury rights in the Constitution, too.172 It is, accordingly,
troublesome that the Supreme Court appears to be able to rewrite
congressional statutes on these matters at its pleasure.
To be sure, when Congress was mulling over the original proposals
for the FRE in the 1970s, it focused more on the federalism
implications than the jury right implications.173 But Congress’s failure
to appreciate the issue in the 1970s is not a good reason for us to ignore
it any longer. And although the early version of the REA included a
special mention that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court must
“preserve[] . . . inviolate” “the right of trial by jury as at common law
and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution,”174
Congress removed the special mention of the jury in its 1988 revisions
to the REA as “redundant”175: the jury was made just one more
“substantive right” that cannot be “abridge[d], enlarge[d], or
modif[ied],”176 a provision notable for its never being enforced.
168. Fed. R. Evid. 105; Fed. R. Evid. 201(f).
169. Fed. R. Evid. 403.
170. Fed. R. Evid. 606. For the Court’s exploration of the congressional legislative
intent here, see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 111, 122–25 (1987), remanded
sub nom., United States v. Conover, 845 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1988); and Warger v. Shauers,
574 U.S. 40, 48 (2014). Yet the REA process would seem to let the Court, without a
case or controversy, supersede Congress’s policy choice here.
171. Fed. R. Evid. 703.
172. E.g. Schauer, supra note 163, at 195 (hearsay rules).
173. H.R. Rep. No. 99-650, at 27, 29 (1973) (separate views of Rep. Holtzman).
174. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064.
175. H.R. Rep. No. 99-422, at 20 n.4 (1985) (“The requirement in present 28 U.S.C.
2072 that rules ‘preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution’ has been omitted as redundant.”).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
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However, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the
way the Federal Sentencing Guidelines implicated jury rights in the
important case of United States v. Booker177 (and therein deciding that
because of jury right implications all the Sentencing Guidelines
needed to be downgraded from mandatory to advisory),178 it is high
time we take seriously how the FRE sufficiently bump against jury rights
that the REA-with-supersession is just the wrong way to respect the
Constitution.
Basic principles of contemporary administrative law further
underscore suspicion that delegation to the Supreme Court to decide
significant and important questions of constitutional magnitude about
the jury without an Article III case or controversy should be
disfavored.179 To wit, the Court itself has recently emphasized that it
will not breezily and with substantial deference read Congress to
delegate away policy decisions with significant social, political, or
economic effects.180 How much more should the Court look with
skepticism on broad delegations not merely to make rules of
constitutional moment, but to rewrite congressional statutes about
these matters, too. Indeed, the Court should bring this administrative
law model to bear against the delegation of major questions to itself in
the REA with respect to the FRE. Although this administrative law
apparatus usually controls delegation to Article II entities rather than
Article III entities,181 since Article III judges are effectively acting like a
super-charged administrative agency when they author FRE rules that
can supersede congressional statutes (and state law), the so-called
177. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
178. Id. at 266.
179. This is not just my quirky view. In 1975 when the House was considering what
became the FRE, Elizabeth Holtzman gave expression to concerns about “the
procedure for amending” the FRE: “The Supreme Court is not given the power under
Article III of the Constitution to legislate rules on substantive matters. It can pass such
judgments only in the context of a particular case or controversy. Yet, H.R. 5453 allows
the Court to promulgate a rule in a substantive policy area without the benefit of an
adversary proceeding. We cannot (and should not) delegate such rule-making power
to the Supreme Court.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, at 27, 28–29 (1973) (separate views of
Rep. Holtzman).
180. See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 484–87 (2015); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 267 (2006); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 147 (2000).
See generally Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic
Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2021–24 (2018);
Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV.
19, 20–22 (2010).
181. Loshin, supra note 180, at 27 n.36.
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“major questions” doctrine can be read to throw shade upon the REA’s
application to the FRE. Given that the Court is already loath to permit
Congress to determine the metes and bounds of constitutional rights
in the first place,182 delegating that power away seems even less likely
to be permissible. Even though that delegation ends up in the Court’s
hands, it is not in its capacity as an expositor of the Constitution,
convened as an Article III entity. Rather, it is operating during its
rulemakings as a ministerial agency, so it should not have magisterial
powers to contour the constitutional rights to the jury there.
Going back to Wigmore at least, evidence law from early on took a
fairly pro-judge and anti-jury posture.183 Although Wigmore distanced

182. It will take me too far afield to explore the relevance of the Crowell, Northern
Pipeline, Schor, and Granfinanciera line of cases. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62–
65 (1932); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52–55, 88
(1982) (plurality opinion); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 858 (1986); Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 36, 64 (1989). But it is modest to say they stand for a
level of discomfort the Court has expressed with Congress delegating away jury rights
to administrative agencies and non-Article III adjudicators. Perhaps the more direct
path to support the more basic suspicion the Court has with Congress’s power to
define constitutional rights would be City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20, 533–
34, 536 (1997) or Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).
I concede, however, that it is hard to deny that administrative agencies
routinely use their delegation to affect constitutional rights. See Gillian E. Metzger,
Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897–98, 1900–02 (2013)
(exploring and defending the practice). Still, courts would struggle with giving
agencies deference on core questions of the reach of constitutional rights, even if the
administrative interpretations would not be deemed ultra vires because the relevant
statute could be read to delegate some authority in the area.
183. See PORWANCHER, supra note 19, at 42 (highlighting that Wigmore took from
Thayer a preference for judge rather than jury determinations about facts regarding
foreign law); id. at 55 (arguing that Wigmore took from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. a
“willingness to remove questions of negligence from the juror and entrust them to the
judge” and a belief that “the judge was more favorably positioned than the jury to
accord the resolution of an individual case with the aggregate social welfare”); id. at
69 (describing Wigmore as “dubious of juries”); id. at 78 (finding Wigmore to
“express[] a certain pessimism about jurors”); id. at 79 (“A traditional view of evidence
history—to which Wigmore . . . subscribed—holds that the law of evidence developed
as a filter to guard against the bias of jurors.”); id. at 107 (“Wigmore championed
increased judicial discretion . . . .”); id. at 114 (“Wigmore consistently advocated
increased judicial discretion throughout [his treatise].”); id. at 115 (noting that
Wigmore believed the judge should express his or her opinion about the weight of
evidence to jurors before they retired for deliberations); id. at 116 (highlighting the
judge’s role in excluding evidence that could “confuse or mislead the jury”). As
Eleanor Swift shows, this pre-dates Wigmore, too. See generally Swift, supra note 19, at
2439–40.
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himself from the FRE project (which started as an ALI Model Code in
his lifetime184) ultimately—in part because he thought it was better to
keep the rules advisory, in part because he thought supersession was
nutty, and in part because he was worried about the legacy of his own
work should the Model Code or FRE succeed185—one has to be left
with meaningful concerns about the ways our evidence law can too
easily alter constitutional jury rights by judge-made rules that
undermine the jury. At the very least this kind of concern must permit
taking a fresh look at the processes by which all this law that surrounds
the jury and its residual power gets made.186
And that process probably should not take the current form of the
REA as it applies to the FRE. Rather, better interbranch dialogue187 on
these central constitutional jury rights is necessary. The current regime
of supersession—the Supreme Court being able to convene as a nonArticle III entity unilaterally capable of re-writing U.S. Code—is
neither respectful of legislative supremacy in statutory realms nor of
judicial supremacy in constitutional realms. What justifies judicial
supremacy when it is appropriate (for those who embrace it, anyway)
are the constraints of Article III: that the Supreme Court is announcing
constitutional law in the context of a case or controversy. A Supreme
Court acting outside of an adjudicatory Article III context188 should not
be able to trump our most democratic branch on matters that pertain

184. PORWANCHER, supra note 19, at 159.
185. On Wigmore’s ambivalent relationship to the Model Code, see id. at 159–61.
186. None of this is to deny that we are probably on a trajectory in evidence law to
greater admissibility, which tends to mitigate the worry that judges just use their
discretionary power to take questions away from the jury. See Paul Rothstein, Some
Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. BAR J. 21, 21–26 (1974)
(identifying the FRE as both granting more discretion to judges and increasing
evidence admissibility); Posting of Frederick C. Moss to the Evidence Listserv, evid-facl@chicagokent.kentlaw.edu (on file with author) (detailing all the FRE that increase
admissibility). However, even if that trajectory continues, there is a structural problem
that remains: the judges are both the gatekeepers for the admission of evidence to the
jury and are also the rule makers about how to allocate power between themselves and
juries. There is a conflict of interest.
187. For a recent effort to explain what this can mean, see James J. Brudney & Ethan
J. Leib, Statutory Interpretation as “Interbranch Dialogue”?, 66 UCLA L. REV. 346, 348–51
(2019).
188. See United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (“[A]ll rulemaking is
nonjudicial in the sense that rules impose standards of general application divorced
from the individual fact situation which ordinarily forms the predicate for judicial
action.”).
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to what many might realistically perceive to be our most democratic
institution, the jury.189
Notice that this view is not wholly in tension with the Court’s
announcement in Mistretta that “consistent with the separation of
powers, Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch nonadjudicatory
functions that do not trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch
and that are appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary.”190
Although it might be a reach to say that the jury is a branch of its own,
independent of the Judicial Branch, there is something a little
untoward about judges alone—particularly ones on the Supreme
Court who have no regular experience with juries191—fashioning the
balance of power between judges and juries in a way that can rewrite
Congress’s preferences without the benefit of a case or controversy.
That makes the FRE context unique and distinctively unacceptable.
Even under Mistretta, the current rulemaking regime for the FRE,
which puts the amending and repealing power “within the Judicial
Branch,”192 has the “practical consequences” of “pos[ing a] threat of
undermining the integrity of the Judicial Branch or of expanding the
powers of the Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds.”193
***
189. See generally SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES (2016).
190. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 388.
191. There was once a reported jury trial in the Supreme Court. See Lochlan F.
Shelfer, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208, 210–13 (2013) (discussing
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794)). Shelfer reports that there were at least
three jury trials in the Supreme Court in the 1790s but none for the last two centuries.
Id. at 210. And of our sitting justices, only Justice Sotomayor has been a regular
member of a trial court that could use juries. See, e.g., Robert W. Pratt, A Trial Judge on
the Supreme Court, 23, FED. SENT’G REP. 159, 160–61 (2010) (observing that Justice
Sotomayor’s background as a trial judge is unique on the Court).
192. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393.
193. Id. It is probably worth noting that when the Court changed all of the
Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines from mandatory to advisory in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), it tried to hold the line on Mistretta and pretend as if the
delegation holding there should remain untouched by the atmospherics of
downgrading the Commission’s power. But in doing so it actually misstated—in a
revealing way—how to think about the FRE in light of Mistretta. The Court wrote: “We
noted [in Mistretta] that the promulgation of the Guidelines was much like other
activities in the Judicial Branch, such as the creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
all of which are nonadjudicatory activities.” Id. at 242. But the Judicial Branch did not
create the FRE as law; Congress did. What the REA improperly does is give the Judicial
Branch the power to rewrite the FRE—repeal authority it cannot have in
“nonadjudicatory activities.”
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Something has to change. And we need a better model for
legislative-judicial dialogue about federal-state relationships and core
jury rights in connection with the FRE. Part III therefore takes up the
project of where to go from here, given that a range of formal and
functional arguments coalesce to make clear that something is amiss
in the REA provisions that allow supersession in the FRE context.
Before I get there, however, Part II explores a few efforts to justify
supersession others have offered that I think are ultimately
unsuccessful. If the Court, Congress, and the Advisory Committee are
going to be asked to do their FRE business differently, we should be
sure this case is air-tight.
II. THE APOLOGETICS FOR SUPERSESSION
There are a variety of apologies others offer for the REA’s design to
allow Court-promulgated rules to displace congressional statutes.
Many of them stem from a need to justify the first rulemaking effort in
1938 for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But even if the original
sin of supersession can be forgiven in 1938, many of those justifications
have faded from relevance—and indeed are inapposite in the FRE
context. It makes some sense why Congress felt the first version of the
REA needed some kind of supersession provision: there was extant
procedural “undergrowth” that spanned the federal statute books, and
it would have been hard for Congress to specify all of the places in the
U.S. Code that would need to be repealed in an anticipatory way to
make room for a unified Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that was a
few years in the offing.194 So Congress made a choice that one might
call a “conditional sunset”: when the rules were ready to take effect (as
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in fact were in 1938, four years
after the passage of the REA), Congress made explicit its intent to

194. See Carrington, supra note 23, at 324 (arguing that supersession allows
rulemaking to “clear away from the timbers of important and enduring federal
legislation the undergrowth of procedural marginalia that may have been attached to
legislation for faded or forgotten reasons”). Although the “undergrowth” justification
for supersession is made rather generally by Carrington, it is Stephen Burbank who is
more explicit that this original justification in the 1934 version of the REA was
especially plausible. See Burbank, supra note 113, at 1044 (“As originally formulated,
the supersession clause was intended to ‘clear . . . undergrowth,’ although it was by no
means limited to ‘procedural marginalia.’ Nor is it so limited today . . . . The notion
that, in 1989, the statutory provisions at risk of supersession consist primarily of
‘procedural marginalia’ is, in any event, hard to accept.”); accord Burbank, supra note
23, at 1052–54; Kelleher, supra note 73, at 399.
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repeal conflicting statutes, necessary in light of the canon of
interpretation that implied repeals are to be disfavored.195 Whatever
one thinks of the legitimacy of this congressional delegation, it is a long
way from a relatively specific conditional sunset to a generalized right
to make rules that supersede and displace duly enacted statutes under
the Constitution’s Article I, Section 7 in an ongoing way, to apply even
to statutes that have not yet been enacted. And that—in conjunction
with the more subject-specific rationales in Section I.B—explains the
real problem with the FRE rulemaking process as it exists today. Below
I briefly review (and ultimately dismiss) some classes of justifications
for this feature of the REA system as applied to the FRE. Putting to one
side the particularized use of a conditional sunset—which has some
other corollaries in the U.S. Code (Section II.C)—any modern law
student who has a basic familiarity with constitutional law, legislation,
and regulation could spot the issue with the delegation of legislative
power to repeal statutory law.196
A. The Congressional Research Service (1988)
In the lead-up to the 1988 revisions to the REA, the House knew
there was a “cloud” of suspicion about supersession and sought to get
rid of the REA’s authorization for rules that could undermine and
repeal statutes.197 Indeed, the House version of the bill was explicit that
it prospectively rid the REA of supersession altogether for all federal
rulemaking regimes.198 The Report accompanying its bill repealing
supersession insisted that the “original justification for the
supersession clause [was] no longer valid,” and in light of
recodifications of the U.S. Code and more specific repeals of
procedural laws that preexisted the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
195. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549 (1974).
196. Indeed, by 1985, a Harvard law student urged the invalidity of the supersession
clause in the Harvard Law Review. See Note, The Conflict Between Rule 68 and the Civil
Rights Attorneys’ Fees Statute: Reinterpreting the Rules Enabling Act, 98 HARV. L. REV. 828,
835–37 (1985). And a 2011 Note by an NYU law student that was purporting to furnish
a separation of powers defense for the REA process still could not quite find a way to
address the “constitutional question of the supersession clause’s validity.” Michael
Blaise, Note, A Separation of Powers Defense of Federal Rulemaking Power, 66 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 593, 638 (2011). Blaise claimed in his conclusion to have provided a
“defense of the supersession clause,” id. at 639, but his tepid defense was largely that
federal courts have failed to deal with it—so there must be “no clear answer,” id. at
638.
197. H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 1, 17 (1985).
198. H.R. 3550, 99th Cong., 131 Cong. Rec. 35,190 (1985).
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Procedure, the clause “no longer serve[d] the purpose for which it was
intended.”199 Moreover, the Report concluded that “as a matter of
policy, it is unwise to permit a procedural rule-making process to be
used, in effect, to overturn provisions of law enacted by Congress,” and
worried that the then-recently decided Chadha case might implicate
the legality of supersession.200
Yet there was a concerted effort to lobby for supersession by the
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, which was eager to preserve
it201 (and their power as a super-legislature of sorts with it). Here is how
the Reporter of that committee remembers the issue:
I succeeded in enlisting the aid of the ABA Section on Litigation,
the American College of Trial Lawyers, and the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York . . . . Former Attorney General Ben
Civiletti, then chair of the ABA Section, offered testimony in favor
of supersession. Professors Edward Cooper, Mary Kay Kane, and
Charles Alan Wright also submitted statements supporting
supersession. Professors Judith Resnik, representing the ACLU, and
Stephen Burbank submitted statements opposing supersession. The
Advisory Committee’s support for supersession prevailed in the
Senate, and the law as enacted in 1988 retained the supersession
clause.202

Although the public record of the Senate’s consideration is pretty
conclusory—“the Senate [was] not convinced that there [was] a . . .
need to amend the supersession clause and was persuaded that the
current system [was] working well and should be continued”203—the
Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) American Law Division wrote
a memo that outlined a defense of supersession that likely further
convinced the Senate to preserve supersession in the 1988 update of

199. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, pt. 1, at 28 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5982, 5988.
200. Id. It is true, however, that they let through supersession anyway when push
came to shove. Id. at 5989–90.
201. Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 618 (2010).
202. Id. at 618–69.
203. 134 Cong. Rec. 31,052 (statement of Sen. Howell Heflin). The Senate seemed
to draw this conclusion from three witnesses, including one Janet Napolitano. Id.; see
The Rules Enabling Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts. and Admin. Prac. of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 4 (1989) (statement of Janet Napolitano) (“My testimony
to you today boils down to one phrase: If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”).
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the REA.204 However, it did not provide genuinely convincing
arguments.
While acknowledging constitutional problems with supersession that
were before Congress as of 1988,205 CRS focused attention on “the
lenient requirements which the Supreme Court has developed for
evaluating the validity of” delegations.206 Drawing on Justice White’s
functionalist dissent in Chadha, CRS argued that agency rulemaking
must be understood realistically as a form of lawmaking.207 From this
minority view in Chadha, CRS further played word games with the
Administrative Procedure Act. CRS highlighted that when Congress
defined agency “rule[s]” there, it wrote that these are agency
statements “designed to implement or prescribe law or policy,”
ostensibly acknowledging that agencies can make law.208 It also
highlighted that many jurists often talk as if rules have “the force and
effect of law,”209 and that we allow agencies to use their “law” to preempt state law for the purposes of the Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause.210 Thus, CRS analogized the Court’s rulemaking power to a
standard administrative delegation from a congressional statute.
Yet there is some important distance to travel from talking about
executive agencies and their function of implementing and making
effectual congressional statutes as a kind of lawmaking to arming
entities with the power to repeal congressional laws. From the
204. See Memorandum from the Am. L. Div., Cong. Rsch. Serv. on Supersession
Clauses of the Rules Enabling Acts to Rep. Robert Kastenmeier (April 18, 1988)
[hereinafter CRS Memo] (available in Court Reform and Access to Justice Act: Hearings on
H.R. 3152 Before the Subcomm. on Cts., C.L. & the Admin. of Just. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 1294–1304 (1989). Eventually, the House bought into some
form of supersession. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, pt. 1, at 3 (1988).
205. The memo cites an early article to raise these issues. CRS Memo, supra note
204, at 1 (citing Robert N. Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study
on the Need for Reform of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IOWA L. REV. 15 (1977)).
206. CRS Memo, supra note 204, at 2.
207. Id. at 3–4 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985–86 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
208. Id. at 3 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)).
209. Id. at 3–4 (emphasis added) (citing, among five other cases, Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)).
210. Id. at 7–8. CRS argues that since it is only “laws of the United States” that are
supreme over state law, regulations’ pre-emptive force prove that they are laws as far
as the Constitution is concerned. Id. at 7. There is a logical leap here worth noting: the
agency gets it preemption authority from the organic statute itself, so it seems that CRS
misses that whatever preemptive force a regulation has is derivative of an actual statute
(a constitutional “law”).
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unexceptional proposition that “limits are not reached by the
conferral of authority to have some affect [sic.] upon statutes enacted
by Congress”211—drawing upon sunset provisions and provisions that
“revive[]” upon specific determinations by the Executive212—CRS too
quickly analogized permissions for contingent legislation as somehow
sanctioning statutory repeals by the Supreme Court via the REA
(foreshadowing what the Court tried to say about the REA in its
footnote in Clinton213).
The CRS found a better analogue in J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United
States.214 There, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, the Court blessed
a congressional statute that set a base tariff in a statutory scheme and
then delegated power to the President to adjust the tariff upward or
downward up to fifty percent upon specific findings about changing
differences in the costs of production.215 Finding and establishing the
“intelligible principle” standard for valid delegations, the Court
claimed that Congress gave the President enough guidance to render
his findings.216 Although CRS invoked Louis Jaffe’s reading of the case
that “[t]he President, thus, could in effect make a tax rate and by so
doing repeal the existing one,”217 that is a pretty generous reading of
what was a constrained and pre-authorized adjustment of a tariff rate
based on rather specific findings the President had to make to adjust
the tax.218 What CRS seemed to be relying on, in the final analysis, was
that “the doctrine of nondelegation . . . appear[ed] unlikely to
resurface in an area with such a long history of delegation, that of
conferring court rulemaking authority upon the federal courts.”219
No doubt, many delegation issues associated with the REA seemed
already disposed of by 1941 in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,220 which upheld
two Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that allowed a U.S district court
to order a physical exam of a plaintiff, which might not have been
211. Id. at 5.
212. Id. (citing The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813)). CRS addressed
other “contingency” cases in id. at 6–7.
213. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 446 n.40 (1998).
214. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
215. Id. at 400–02, 409, 412–13.
216. Id. at 409.
217. CRS Memo, supra note 204, at 6 (quoting LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 59 (1965)).
218. I address one similar minor-rate-adjustment case in lower courts infra notes
280–88 and accompanying text.
219. CRS Memo, supra note 204, at 8–9.
220. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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within the power of a state court to order. The Court held: “Congress
has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of
federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or
other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the
statutes or [C]onstitution of the United States.”221 Notwithstanding
that the rule of procedure at issue might very well have “abridge[d],
enlarge[d], []or modif[ied] the substantive rights of [a] litigant” in
the case, the Court had no trouble concluding that “a rule . . . if within
the power delegated to this court, has the force of a federal statute.”222
That sits in some tension, of course, with its earlier pronouncement
that the rules must be “not inconsistent with the statutes.”223 But one
would not be crazy for thinking that the presumptive implication is
that “the rules, if they are within the authority granted by Congress,
repeal” congressional acts that are inconsistent with the Federal
Rules.224
Although the CRS Memo did not fully pull all these strings from
Sibbach together into a tight knot, this would be the strongest use of
Sibbach in service of the validity of supersession (ignoring the possibility
that supersession only would apply to statutes effective at the time of
the REA or that the civil procedure rules are, after all, fundamentally
different from the FRE). CRS did, after noting Sibbach’s permissiveness
about the REA, draw attention back to the ways that the REA sought to
be a contingent repeal of any and all pre-existing statutes225 (even,
presumably, statutes that post-date the REA but pre-date the
promulgated Federal Rule in conflict with it).
Yet while it is true that the four dissenting justices in Sibbach lost even
after announcing what cannot be denied—“[p]lainly the Rules are not
acts of Congress and cannot be treated as such”226—it is hard to draw
the general validity of supersession for all time from the specific
contingent repeal theory, which at least has the virtue of limiting the
potential repeals to a constrained world of procedural undergrowth as
of 1934, a proposition that could have seemed plausible in 1941 but
221. Id. at 9–10.
222. Id. at 7–8, 13.
223. Id. at 9.
224. Id. at 10. The Court was writing specifically of the Conformity Act of 1872, Act
of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (1878), the main “undergrowth” that
Congress knew would be displaced by the forthcoming Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when it passed the REA in 1934.
225. CRS Memo, supra note 204, at 8–9.
226. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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should have seemed substantially more fishy by 1988. Still, CRS could
not help but conclude that the “absence of constitutional challenge is
suggestive,” and concluded that supersession was a permissible
delegation of authority under Chadha.227 Although it did not, and
could not, deny that the Court as a whole in Palermo v. United States228—
and various members of the Court in dissenting to Supreme Court
orders promulgating rules under the REA229—expressed discomfort
with the idea of supersession, CRS doubled-down on “no history of
constitutional challenge,”230 found some dicta in a 1973 case which
suggested that supersession was probably just fine,231 and admitted that
there had not been serious “consideration of the issue” by lower
courts.232
In the final analysis, the CRS Memo provided the Senate plausible
cover but should not have been viewed as moving the needle far in
favor of supersession. Indeed, although the memo was addressed to
House member Robert Kastenmeier, Kastenmeier remained an
opponent of supersession in the House version of the bill; the House
Report post-dates the CRS Memo and, seemingly, was not significantly
influenced by it.233 As it shouldn’t have been. And let’s not forget that
Clinton had yet to be decided, which makes supersession even less
acceptable, at least with respect to the FRE.

227. CRS Memo, supra note 204, at 9. Paul Carrington similarly concludes that “lack
of public interest in the matter” of supersession “is itself a datum pertinent to the
argument” in favor of supersession. Carrington, supra note 23, at 282. It is possible that
complacency about constitutional violations is an argument against seeing violations
as violations.
228. 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959) (“The power of this Court to prescribe rules of
procedure and evidence for the federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant
Act of Congress.”).
229. See the dissenting statements of Justices Black and Douglas in 374 U.S. 865
(1963) and 383 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1966), noting that the Rules of Civil Procedure
determine substantive rights of litigants and the Constitution requires those to be
enacted by Congress and approved by the President.
230. CRS Memo, supra note 204, at 9.
231. Id. at 10 (citing Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973)) (“Were we
confronted with an express conflict between the Rule and a prior statute, the force of
[the Rules Enabling Act], providing that ‘[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be
of no further force or effect,’ is such that the prior inconsistent statute would be
deemed to have been repealed.”).
232. Id. at 10.
233. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, pt. 1, at 28 (1988) as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5982, 5988. The report did, in the final analysis, sign onto a limited form of
supersession, however ambivalently.
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B. The “Inherent Authority” Theory
Another tactic used by supporters of supersession is to rely on some
kind of “inherent judicial power”234 to explain why it would be
constitutionally acceptable for courts and the Supreme Court to ignore
and repeal congressional statutes. There are formalist and
functionalist flavors of this strategy, but neither one is quite successful.
A formalist might focus on Article III’s “vesting clause”235 to argue
that courts have a mandate (or a permission) to regulate procedure.236
They might emphasize that federal courts have “inherent Article III
power to control their internal process and the conduct of civil
litigation,”237 and that procedure is “an area in which the court has a
special constitutional role,” such that “the courts . . . possess some
inherent power to regulate procedure, even in the absence of
congressional provision.”238 They might point to the Supreme Court’s
highlighting that there are “matters which relate to the administration
of legal proceedings, an area in which federal courts have traditionally
exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers
Congress expressly conferred in the Rules.”239 Congress may even be
said to recognize this reality that it ought to step aside in the way it
wrote the REA—with a supersession clause, to boot (assuming this is
not a little boot-strapping).240
But there is a sleight of hand here. Is some inherent power to control
what goes on in the courtroom (say, by way of local rules or case-bycase exercise of discretion in contempt proceedings) enough to arm
the judiciary with a non-adjudicative function of general rulemaking
for the entire federal court system?241 More importantly, even if Article

234. See generally Michael M. Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not
Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEX. L. REV. 167 (1979).
235. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
236. E.g., Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act)
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 63 (1998). For a careful argument about the
powers courts should have over procedure—and their constitutional limits, see Amy
Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 815–17 (2008).
237. Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and
Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1287 (1993).
238. Kelleher, supra note 73, at 435.
239. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–73 (1965).
240. See Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial Rulemaking: A
Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41, 68 (1988).
241. See Kelleher, supra note 73, at 436. Kelleher concludes that the “Court’s
decisions are fairly read as recognizing only an inherent authority in the judicial
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III goes that far in the absence of congressional limitation, it is far less likely
that whatever implied non-adjudicative rulemaking power inheres in
the judiciary is sufficient to displace Congress when it acts,
underwriting supersession.242 Think about this in Youngstown’s
Jacksonian terms: whatever “inherent power” there might be within
Article III would be at its nadir when congressional law is in conflict
with a judicial rule.243 Yet the REA supersession regime always gives the
judiciary a trump in a situation of conflict. That requires a very strong
inherent authority argument.
Indeed, notwithstanding one very extreme argument that “all
legislative rules for judiciary procedure are void constitutionally,”244 it
is widely understood that since Article III and Article I authorize
Congress to set up lower courts, that greater power to set them up or
abolish them includes the lesser authority to regulate their
procedures.245 The theory would have to be that there is some form of
concurrent authority that would enable Congress to delegate away a
form of its own lawmaking authority in this domain. Yet the Court
itself, in the canonical case of Wayman v. Southard,246 has held that its
authority to promulgate rules emanates from congressional
delegation, and the very issue in dispute is whether the delegation to
allow an offloading of repeal authority is permissible. This is especially
troubling in the FRE context where supersession has the regular effect
of repeal. At least in the more “purely” procedural areas, Congress sets
in motion its own getting out of the way in the REA. But in the context
of the FRE, Congress asserted quite substantially its own authority by
setting down the rules of evidence as statutes.247 That is hardly taking a

branch to control procedure in the context of adjudicating particular cases.” Kelleher, supra
note 236, at 66 (emphasis added).
242. See Tyrrell Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure,
22 WASH. U.L.Q. 459, 505–06 (1937) (highlighting the weakness of this kind of
argument in supporting supersession); Burbank, supra note 23, at 1116 (same).
243. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing when inherent power might be at its “lowest
ebb”).
244. John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void
Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1929). Wigmore would have had to conclude that
the Federal Rules of Evidence—since they were passed as statutes—were all void and
unconstitutional upon adoption.
245. E.g., Carrington, supra note 23, at 285.
246. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 15, 42–43, 50 (1825).
247. Whitten acknowledges as much. See Whitten, supra note 240, at 69 (“[W]hile
‘inherent power’ in the judiciary to formulate rules in the absence of congressional
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posture of “forbearance or deference” to the “judiciary’s inherent
authority.”248
Shy of formal inherent authority from Article III, however, is a more
functionalist story about special expertise that inheres rulemaking
authority in the judiciary. As Linda Mullenix articulates it, “procedural
rulemaking ought not to be a matter of majoritarian legislative public
policy.”249 Or Paul Carrington: “An important reason for court
rulemaking is that complex technical issues of judicial practice cannot
sustain attention through the political process. What is everyone’s
business is no one’s special political concern.”250 Carrington tells the
story of procedural reformers like Pound who were focused on the
“depoliticization of judicial procedure”: “they feared and expected
that groups of prospective litigants seeking short-term advantage
through the legislature would neutralize the long-term effectiveness of
judicial institutions and subject them to close oversight by the
legislature.”251 Thus the choice in the REA was self-consciously “antidemocratic in the sense that it withdrew ‘procedural’ law-making from
the political arena and made it the activity of professional
technicians.”252
This delegate-and-defer-to-expertise narrative is, of course, well
known from administrative law253 and should be familiar to anyone
trying to justify the growth of the administrative state—around 1934
and beyond. And yet the expertise justification sounds like a just-so
story, since the delegation is principally, remember, to the Supreme
Court, which is not very expert about what goes on in the district
courts; currently, only Justice Sotomayor has ever served on a district

action is relevant to the validity of supersession provisions, it does not ultimately solve
the more important problem of whether the general delegation of rulemaking power
over an area violates separation of powers restrictions when Congress has occupied the
area by statute.”).
248. Letter from Phillip D. Brady, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Hon. Peter
Rodino, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, Sept. 16, 1985 (available in H.R. REP.
NO. 99-422, at 46 (1985)) (arguing to retain supersession provisions that the House
wanted to remove in their 1985 version of the REA that never passed the Senate).
249. Mullenix, supra note 237, at 1288.
250. Carrington, supra note 23, at 282.
251. Id. at 301.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Nestor Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond,
103 GEO. L.J. 259, 287, 287 n.139 (2015).
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court.254 And whatever else can be said for the general idea that courts
should make their own procedural rules when delegated authority to
do so, the entire corpus of administrative law would have to be brought
to bear on the rulemaking process to legitimate delegate-and-defer, a
corpus which includes constitutional delegation limits.255
Finally, some variations of this pragmatic account of concurrent
authority between Congress and the Court vindicate supersession
through another part of the REA: the “report and wait” requirement,
which gives Congress some time to process and deliberate about
whatever rules the Supreme Court chooses to promulgate before they
go into effect (as consequence of congressional silence).256 For
example, one analyst of this terrain concludes that “the ‘report and
wait’ provisions of the REA, coupled with the relatively specific limiting
language of the ‘substantive rights’ provision, do provide a degree of
control over the exercise of delegated power sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of the delegation doctrine.”257 Carrington also thinks the
reporting requirement is there to alert Congress to the possibility of
supersession, somehow justifying it.258 But Stephen Burbank put this
idea to rest: not only is legislative acquiescence through silence a kind
of canard in this context,259 but reporting would be valuable even in
the absence of supersession—so it is unlikely to be a good basis to
vindicate supersession.260
In sum, Burbank seems to have it exactly right that supersession
sends the wrong message about which entities should have

254. Before her, the last Justice with U.S. district court experience was Charles
Evans Whitaker, who left the court in 1962—long before the FRE came into effect.
Thanks to Andrew Kent for the historical note.
255. There is an analogy here to Cass Sunstein—once Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs—telling us over and over again how technical
the work of his expert office was such that we should not worry how opaque and
undemocratic its functioning is. See Davidson & Leib, supra note 253, at 268 n.33 (“In
Sunstein’s recent article on OIRA, he uses the term ‘technical’ twenty-three times in
thirty-eight pages to describe the work done at the office . . . . The word ‘technical’
seems used to assuage us that the work is not lawmaking.”) (citing Cass R. Sunstein,
Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013)).
256. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2074(a).
257. Kelleher, supra note 73, at 445.
258. Carrington, supra note 23, at 322–24.
259. Compare Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987)
(Brennan, J.) with id. at 671–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260. See Burbank, supra note 113, at 1043.
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policymaking power, especially in areas covered by the FRE, which so
often bump up against substantive rights:
[It] is that the policy preferences of judges and their advisers, acting
in a legislative capacity but without popular mandate or all of the
restraining influences of the legislative process [or even the
administrative process, I might add], are entitled to supremacy when
they conflict with the policy preferences of the people’s
representatives. Whether or not the supersession clause is consistent
with the formal requirements of the Constitution, it is not . . .
consistent with the vision of a democratic society that inspires that
document.261

C. Snippets of Precedent
There is a different kind of functionalist argument available to
defend supersession that is a little less complacent than moving from
the “we’ve done it this way for a while without too much hassle” to “this
must be constitutional” all-too-quickly. That argument takes the form
of several other separation of powers settlements: supersession “has
acquired through long usage some importance as a subconstitutional
accommodation between co-equal branches of government.”262 As in
other separation of powers environments where different branches
make reasonable claims on authority that is not clearly divvied up by
the Constitution itself,263 perhaps here, too, we should not get too fussy
about supersession as a way Congress and the Supreme Court share
power over procedure in the lower courts, a subject over which they
both can claim some rightful territoriality.264 Perhaps it is not much of
a surprise that the Supreme Court and the academic elite—which gain
power through Congress’s delegation265—are happy to maintain the
status quo. But Congress is at least as complicit, as evidenced by its very
limited interventions in rulemaking generally and its re-upping
261. Id. at 1046.
262. Carrington, supra note 23, at 308–09.
263. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 412–15 (2012) (analyzing the ways in which
the three branches of government have looked to historical practice to answer
questions concerning the separation of powers).
264. The Court’s discussion of the REA in dicta in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 386 (1989) emphasized the recognition of “the constitutionality of a ‘twilight area’
in which the activities of the separate [b]ranches merge,” drawing on Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
265. Sibbach, 321 U.S. at 9–10.
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supersession in 1988, specifically.266 Moreover, there is some
reasonable precedent from more basic administrative law that might
support this institutional settlement, too.
Consider the Controlled Substances Act of 1970.267 When it was first
passed, Congress sought to regulate five classes of controlled
substances “to be known as schedules I, II, III, IV, and V.”268 Schedule
I drugs were to be the most highly regulated and Schedule V drugs
were to be the least regulated.269 Rather than awaiting agency
determinations about which substances should go in which schedule,
Congress instead furnished a baseline list of many drugs, compounds,
and substances, assigning them to various “[initial schedules] . . .
unless and until amended pursuant to section 811 of this title.”270 Thus,
not only did Congress contemplate that “[t]he schedules established
by this section shall be updated and republished on a semiannual basis
during the two-year period beginning one year after [October 27,
1970] and shall be updated and republished on an annual basis
thereafter,”271 but it expected actual “amendment” in accordance with
a process described in § 811.
When one turns to § 811, one learns that the process of statutory
amendment does not follow the structures of Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution. Rather, the statute gives the attorney general (AG)
rulemaking authority (with the magic words triggering the relatively
rare formal rulemaking) to futz with the original 1970 list by adding,
removing, or transferring substances into schedules I through V.272
With help from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the AG
is given a list of factors “determinative of control or removal from
schedules” that should be considered273 and is instructed to comply
with international obligations.274 When a criminal defendant sought to
266. See Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1053, 1058–59 (1993) (noting the limited
instances in which Congress inserted itself in the rulemaking process following the
passage of the REA in 1988, noting how it looks to be “moving to reclaim some degree
of involvement in the rulemaking process,” but still keeping that involvement relatively
limited).
267. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1970).
268. Id. at § 812(a).
269. See id. at § 812(b).
270. Id. at § 812(c) (emphasis added).
271. Id. at § 812(a).
272. Id. at § 811(a).
273. Id. at § 811(c).
274. Id. at § 811(d).
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challenge on non-delegation grounds the AG’s temporary authority to
engage in statutory amendment of the drug schedules under the
Controlled Substances Act (a process with fewer procedural
requirements than the more permanent amendments the AG can
make through formal rulemaking), the Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the challenge: in Touby v. United States,275 the Court found that
there were sufficient constraints on the AG that no non-delegation
challenge could succeed.276 Thus Congress and another branch share
the control of the classification of drugs. However, the Executive
Branch seems able to “amend” statutory law and no one bats an eyelash
(though there are admittedly substantial procedural safeguards in
place under the statute).
Or consider the Federal Circuit’s decision in Terran v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services.277 The court there had to analyze a
Presentment Clause challenge to dimensions of the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986.278 That Act provided for
compensation to those injured or killed in vaccine-related incidents; it
created an “Initial Table” setting rates and delegated to the Secretary
of Health and Human Services regulatory authority to “modify” and
“amend” that table.279 Once the Secretary acted pursuant to its
authority and promulgated a “Modified Table” that removed some
DPT-related injuries from the chart, someone sued challenging the
Secretary’s authority to change statutory law under bicameralism and
presentment and non-delegation theories.280 The Federal Circuit was
underwhelmed:
Although we acknowledge that the statutory language in section
300aa-14(c) refers to the Secretary’s ability ‘to modify’ and ‘to
amend’ the Vaccine Injury Table, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c)(1), (2)
(1994), a closer reading of that section makes clear that when the
275. 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
276. Id. at 169. The Court made no mention of the way the AG can effectuate
statutory amendments by changing the statutory schedules. The Court was satisfied
that the AG’s decision-making was subject to intelligible principles and adequate
process, so found no violation of the constitutional separation of powers.
Still, some delegation concerns have been ventilated in other ways, for example,
disallowing the AG to use this kind of rulemaking authority to preempt Oregon’s
Death with Dignity Act in Gonzales v. Oregon. 546 U.S. 243, 274–75 (2006).
277. 195 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
278. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300aa-1 to 34).
279. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-14(a)–(c).
280. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1305–06, 1308.
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Secretary acts pursuant to [her authority], she does not change in
any way the original injury table found in [the statute], but rather
promulgates an entirely new vaccine injury table. This new table
applies only prospectively. The Initial Table remains codified and
unaltered, and continues to apply to all petitions filed before the
revision. Therefore, the Initial Table is not amended.281

To reinforce its creative reading effectively denying that this should
count as an “amendment” or “repeal,” the Terran court reasoned that
the delegation of authority to the Secretary here was a kind of
contingent sunset—and drew upon the REA for support:
[T]he Supreme Court’s power to ‘repeal’ [sic.] laws by promulgating
rules of procedure for the lower federal courts does not run afoul of
the Presentment Clause because ‘Congress itself made the decision
to repeal prior rules upon the occurrence of a particular event—
here, the promulgation of procedural rules by this Court.’282

As R. Craig Kitchen summarizes, “[r]easoning that the Rules
Enabling Act was thus functionally similar to the Vaccine Act, the court
held that the amendment of the Vaccine Injury Table did not violate
Article I, Section 7, since ‘Congress itself decided to render the Initial
Table ineffective upon the Secretary’s action.’”283
The case did, however, generate a well-reasoned dissent:
In this case, Congress purported to provide for the amendment of
existing legislation, which was otherwise valid and enforceable by the
courts of the United States, in a manner different from that provided
in the Constitution, namely by authorizing an Executive Branch
official to do it. That effort must necessarily fail. The majority’s
valiant effort to uphold the purported amended legislation must also
fail, since no amount of verbal adroitness can change the reality of
what happened.284

But the case has never been criticized by another court. Nor has the
issue been taken up by the Supreme Court.285 Nor has Congress since

281. Id. at 1312.
282. Id. at 1313 (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 446 n.40 (1998)).
283. Kitchen, supra note 71, at 570 (quoting Terran, 195 F.3d at 1313).
284. Terran, 195 F.3d at 1317 (Plager, J., dissenting).
285. Terran, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000). Judge Plager’s dissent was not
completely ignored, however. It was celebrated by Jeffrey A. McLellan, Note, The
Constitutional Challenge to the Vaccine Act in Terran v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services and Its Policy Implications, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 687, 698–99, 710–11 (2003); Erik
Loftus, Note, Constitutional Law—Terran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services:
Modification of Statutes and the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, 24 W. NEW ENG. L.
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tried to curtail the Secretary’s seeming legislative authority under the
Act.
A more recent case at the Supreme Court presumed the validity of
supersession, though the issue was not squarely presented because the
specific Federal Rule of Civil Procedure at issue had been enacted by
Congress (and no one doubts that Congress can supersede itself).286
Still, the Court wrote that “a Rule made law by Congress supersedes
conflicting laws no less than a Rule this Court prescribes.”287 Justice
Thomas (with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor) wrote an
opinion that questioned whether the REA is even applicable when
Congress itself passes a general rule of procedure, such was at issue in
the case, questioning the Court’s reading of the supersession
provision.288 Yet, the Court’s dicta was enough for Judge Easterbrook
to claim that “[a]ny doubts about the force and validity of the
supersession clause were laid to rest in Henderson.”289 That seems to
over-read Henderson. But Easterbrook’s recasting of supersession is still
notable:
The Rules of Civil Procedure, which are established by the Supreme
Court under the Rules Enabling Act, cannot “repeal” any statute; the
Constitution does not give the Judicial Branch any power to repeal
laws enacted by the Legislative Branch. But Congress may itself
decide that procedural rules in statutes should be treated as
fallbacks, to apply only when rules are silent. And it has done just
this, providing in what has come to be called the supersession
clause . . . .290

REV. 177, 191 (2002); and Kitchen, supra note 71. The First Circuit, in O’Connell v.
Shalala, also had alluded to constitutional issues in the statute as follows:
[T]he Act may raise questions under the Presentment Clause, which requires
that all federal laws must be passed by both houses of Congress and signed by
the President. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
954 (1983) (“Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must
conform with Art[icle] I.”). Since this issue is not raised in the instant petition,
we take no view of it.
O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d at 173 n.2.
286. See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 668 (1996).
287. Id.
288. See id. at 679 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the REA’s supersession
provision only applies to rules promulgated by the Supreme Court rather than
procedural rules enacted Congress).
289. N. Border Pipeline Co. v. 64.111 Acres of Land in Will Cnty., Ill., 344 F.3d 693,
694 (7th Cir. 2003).
290. Id.
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Whether Easterbrook is right that the REA’s supersession provision
makes background procedural statutes mere “fallbacks” or rather, as
the clause’s plain meaning requires, renders them of no force or effect,
several other circuit courts just decide their cases as if the supersession
provision is a valid rule of construction to help decide which
procedural rules apply in their courts.291
By way of conclusion, a few observations about these snippets of
precedent that seem to support the validity of supersession in some
ways. First, none of the relevant precedents about the REA deals with
supersession with respect to the FRE. So whatever succor supersession
enthusiasts are getting from these cases, the FRE is still a unique
environment that demands fresh attention. Perhaps the bulk of the
procedural rules are sufficiently within a supervisory authority of the
Supreme Court and the judicial power that supersession in connection
with rules of civil and appellate procedure does not raise too much
controversy among the Court and Congress,292 even as all know the
procedure-substance divide is way more difficult to sustain in reality
than in theory.293 Yet, it is notable that supersession with respect to the
FRE—which were passed first as a statutory code rather than through
REA-style rulemaking—has not been tested in the same way. To be
sure, it is the same supersession statute that now applies to all rules
regimes (other than bankruptcy). But as Part I explained, the FRE is
different, in its etiology as well as its ecology.294

291. See, e.g., Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 134 (5th Cir. 1996); Halasa v. ITT
Educational Services, Inc., 690 F.3d 844, 849 (7th Cir. 2012); Griffith Co. v. NLRB, 545
F.2d 1194, 1197 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Chase, 18 F.3d 1166, 1171 (4th
Cir. 1994); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Gay Cottons, 419 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1969);
Albatross Tanker Corp. v. S.S. Amoco Del., 418 F.2d 248, 248 (2d Cir. 1969) (per
curiam).
292. Frankly, the rules of criminal procedure are so tied up with constitutional
rights of criminal defendants, substantive law, and the jury that they would seem deeply
inappropriate for supersession, too. But that is another paper. Very few people bother
to write about these rules. But see Max Minzner, The Criminal Rules Enabling Act, 46 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1047, 1047–49 (2012) (offering one of the only noteworthy discussions
on the REA’s restrictions on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
293. See, e.g., Redish & Amuluru, supra note 79, at 1319 (“It should by now be clear
that the assumption of procedural-substantive mutual exclusivity that apparently
underlay the thinking of both Congress and the Court . . . is totally misguided. No one
today could seriously doubt that procedural rulemaking involves the weighing of
substantial policy interests and dynamically alters the development of the substantive
law.”).
294. See supra Part I.
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It is also worth highlighting that the general administrative law
support for supersession largely comes from contexts in which
Congress seems to set in motion specific baselines with fairly elaborate
processes for accomplishing statutory amendments through other
institutional actors: in the Controlled Substances Act context,
Congress required formal rulemaking (a rarity) and consultation with a
second agency, furnishing the Attorney General with a set of statutory
factors for revising the substances schedules.295 And Congress expected
yearly reporting and publication of schedules, too.296 Similarly, in the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Congress set a baseline
chart with instructions to the agency to revise it as necessary in
consultation with an Advisory Commission,297 requiring it to “provide
for notice and opportunity for a public hearing and at least 180 days
of public comment,”298 anticipating pretty specific kinds of
emendations. Aside from the quirky REA-as-applied-to-the-FRE,
generalized, on-going, wall-to-wall supersession over congressional
statutes with little to no guidance just is not a thing.299 And as should
be obvious, in the administrative context, administrative repeals,
waivers, forbearances, negative lawmaking, or whatever one calls

295. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)–(c).
296. Id. at § 812(a).
297. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(d) (“Except with respect to a regulation recommended
by the Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines, the Secretary may not propose a
regulation under subsection (c) or any revision thereof, unless the Secretary has first
provided to the Commission a copy of the proposed regulation or revision, requested
recommendations and comments by the Commission, and afforded the Commission
at least 90 days to make such recommendations.”).
298. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c).
299. But see Deacon, supra note 71, at 1551 (trying to call administrative repeals of
statutes mere “forbearance” to make it okay). Even Deacon admits that “[a]s a purely
doctrinal matter, it is indeed unclear whether current law allows for such”
administrative repeals of statutes. See id. at 1560. Given that Deacon’s core example
comes from the FCC’s explicit statutory authority to render certain specific statutory
requirements “inapplicable” to particular mobile carriers and to “forbear” if certain
conditions are met to apply regulatory or statutory requirements, it does not seem
especially probative. Id. at 1568–69. Indeed, as we know from MCI v. ATT, 512 U.S. 218,
231–32, 234 (1994), if the FCC uses its modification authority too ambitiously, the
Court will find it acting ultra vires in contravention of its statute. Congress wins. True
enough, Congress modified the FCC’s authority to give it more power in the wake of
MCI, but its careful specification of the FCC’s capacity for forbearance ultimately had
to respect the strictures of the MCI decision. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d
642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding the FCC to have exceeded its statutory authority).
Thanks to Olivier Sylvain for some guidance here.
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them300 can be meaningfully subject to judicial review.301 Judicial review
of the Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority is somewhat less robust,
shall we say. Maybe there is a conflict of interest there?302 Even Justices
Black and Douglas urged that a “transfer of the [rulemaking] function
to the Judicial Conference would relieve [the Court] of the
embarrassment of having to sit in judgment on the constitutionality of
rules which [the Court] approved.”303
It is time to consider a more systemic fix to solve the problem
associated with supersession, particularly with respect to the FRE.
III. A FIX
Having identified a deep dysfunction in the FRE rulemaking system,
I cannot conclude without devising a plausible solution. What I
propose here may not be the only way to solve the constitutional
infirmity of the current regime, but it seems to me the best way to
sustain the important roles both Congress and the Supreme Court play
in the FRE rulemaking environment. There are plenty of good reasons
not to leave the entire apparatus of FRE rulemaking to Congress: they
are inexpert at many of the workaday issues that arise in the
courtroom304 and we should expect substantial politicization and
interest group pressures to distort what is really in the best interests of
the vast majority of litigants.305 And leaving it all to the judiciary might
300. There is literature in administrative law that touches on these questions. See,
e.g., Deacon, supra note 71; Kitchen, supra note 71; Barron & Rakoff, supra note 70;
Kelleher, supra note 73; Richard A. Epstein, Government by Waiver, NAT’L AFFS., Spring
2011.
301. Obviously, 5 U.S.C. § 706.
302. The Supreme Court has never invalidated one of its own rules as beyond its
REA authority. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act,
66 UCLA L. REV. 654, 658 (2019) (“Indeed, it has become common wisdom that the
various Federal Rules are regarded as presumptively valid, suggesting that no serious
person would construe the REA to reach a contrary conclusion, given that the
Supreme Court itself has never done so.”).
303. Order of Jan. 21, 374 U.S. 865, 870 (1963) (Black, J. & Douglas, J., dissenting).
304. See Wigmore, supra note 244, at 278 (“The judiciary knows the needs [of
evidence law] better than does the legislature.”).
305. See, e.g., id. (“The legislature—as experience shows—becomes the catspaw of a
few intriguing lawyers, who from time to time secure an alteration of rules of
procedure to serve selfish ends or to vent petty spite or to embody some personal
narrow view.”); Moore, supra note 266, at 1057 (claiming that “Congress’s involvement
in the process of amending Rules has been troubling” because of the disregard for the
rulemaking process established by the REA and because, in at least one instance, a
congressional amendment was “a political response to the pressures of a discrete
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derogate from Congress’s powers to create the lower federal courts and
the related power to make all laws “necessary and proper” thereto.306
Moreover, because of the unique status of evidence law, the federalism
and jury implications associated with the FRE that I explored in
Section I.B, and the awkwardness of judges sitting in judgment on their
own work-product, it would be best to bring the two branches into
interbranch dialogue about important matters within the FRE. Of
course, the structure of that dialogue needs to meet the formal
demands of Chadha, Clinton, and the non-delegation doctrine.307
Although state-level rulemaking about evidence law is not constrained
by these same formal parameters, there is much one can learn from
paying some attention to the vital and creative discussions in the states
about how best to work through the various claims legislatures and
courts can make on evidence rulemaking. There is not one model that
states have agreed upon—but they are generally more sensitive than
the federal rulemaking process is to the kinds of separation of powers
issues I have explored here.308

interest group rather than a carefully crafted response to procedural inadequacies of
the prior Rule”).
306. See U.S. CONST. art. III; U.S. CONST. art I, sec. 8, cl. 9 & 18.
307. See discussion supra Section I.A.
308. See, e.g., Thomas A. Bishop, Evidence Rulemaking: Balancing the Separation of
Powers, 43 CONN. L. REV. 265, 267 (2010) (exploring ways for the Connecticut courts
to share authority with the legislature over laws of evidence); Robert G.
Lawson, Modifying the Kentucky Rules of Evidence—A Separation of Powers Issue, 88 KY. L.J.
525, 545–46, 549–50 (2000) (developing ideas to manage the Kentucky version of the
REA, which has similar supersession problems); Michael P. Dickey, The Florida Evidence
Code and the Separation of Powers Doctrine: How to Distinguish Substance and Procedure Now
that It Matters, 34 STETSON L. REV. 109, 109–10 (2004) (exploring tensions between
Florida legislative evidence statutes and the highest court’s efforts to reject them);
Patrick Vrobel, Note, Harnessing the Hired Guns: The Substantive Nature of Ohio Revised
Code § 2743.43 Under Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution, 21 J.L. & HEALTH
123, 124, 126–27 (2008) (exploring the Ohio Supreme Court’s efforts to supersede a
state statute); Jeffrey A. Parness, Survey of Illinois Law: The Ins and Outs of the New Illinois
Evidence Rules, 35 S. ILL. U.L.J. 689, 689–90 (2011) (discussing the need for legislative
input over substance in Illinois’s state evidence code—and highlighting divergences
from the FRE); Helen Hershkoff, The Michigan Constitution, Judicial Rulemaking, and
Erie-Effects on State Governance, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 117, 117–18, 132–37 (2014)
(highlighting that Michigan’s evidence law is predominantly promulgated by the
courts). Innovations at the state level include Connecticut’s choice to have its lower
courts doing the evidence rulemaking; Kentucky’s original effort to get its evidence
law jointly promulgated by its legislature and its judiciary; and Michigan’s leaving
evidence rulemaking mostly in the hands of the judiciary.
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So, this is what I recommend for the federal system. First, Congress
should repeal en masse the entirety of the FRE. If Congress wishes to
continue to try to maintain control over privilege law at Rules 501 and
502 as it has wanted to do for federalism reasons (though with mixed
success),309 it could leave those alive as statutes.310 This would leave the
status of the remaining FRE as binding as any other rules regime311—
without the infirmity of having decades of the Supreme Court
promulgating amendments and repeals that effectively muck with the
force and effect of the United States Code, a practice I have argued has
formal and functional deficiencies. That repeal would also have the
benefit of helping the courts develop a unified interpretive approach
to Federal Rules more generally, a problem that is even more

I have not undertaken an exhaustive fifty-state survey about how states manage
similar separation of powers problems in their own evidence rulemaking regimes. I
have no doubt such a project would be illuminating. But since state separation of
powers doctrines and practices in the states often veer from the rules in the federal
ecosystem, see, for example, Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 TEMP. L.
REV. 1171, 1171 (1993) (highlighting that “many state constitutional provisions
dealing with government structure have no federal analogues”), I sought to design a
fix here that was calibrated to federal law.
309. It probably should be emphasized here that the Court has made its imprint on
privilege law through common-law decision-making rather than through its
rulemaking function. See, e.g., Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981)
(attorney-client privilege); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 41–42 (1980)
(spousal privilege); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1996) (psychotherapist-patient
privilege). From one perspective, the rulemaking process might have produced clearer
guidance if the REA had permitted privileges to be developed that way. But from a
constitutional perspective, the Court was constrained in a case or controversy. Going
forward, Congress might want to arm the Court with more rulemaking authority here;
so long as there is an intelligible principle in helping the Court make rules, nothing
needs to prevent Congress from ceding authority here. What it cannot do, however, is
set a policy and then let the Court repeal that policy outside a case or controversy and
with no guidance or meaningful constraint.
310. There is an argument to revert to the pre-2011 version of these rules, which
were amended through the REA process rather than by statute, as Congress had
specifically directed in 1975. The Supreme Court promulgated the 2011 amendments
as “stylistic”—but even stylistic amendments make congressional law of no further
force or effect.
311. If Congress repeals evidence laws that were otherwise never touched by the
REA process after 1975, the Supreme Court probably would have to re-promulgate
those Rules so as to maintain continuity. Given that such an action of dramatic repeal
by Congress would not likely be done without some notice to the Supreme Court, all
parties could prepare to sustain constitutionality and continuity by acting in a
coordinated fashion.
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bedeviling when the rules at issue are currently a messy hybrid in the
FRE.312
This proposed repeal must also include a rewrite of the REA’s
supersession clause as it applies to the FRE. Although the Supreme
Court can be delegated the task of updating its own rules going
forward (so it can “supersede” its own rules), it cannot be delegated
the power to override congressional statutes, as it has now. And when
Congress passes that renovated REA, Congress probably also needs to
spend some time passing actual laws of evidence that the rules of
evidence would not be able to change, much like its effort in current
Rules 501 and 502.313 Such laws might include the range of 1975
commitments about liability insurance, religious beliefs, and selfincrimination that have been altered over time because of
supersession’s effects. Those laws should also furnish “intelligible
principles” to help the Court in its rulemaking efforts to meet the basic
demands of the non-delegation doctrine, but they must also take clear
positions on the federalism implications about preemption and
constitutional jury rights as well. This might mean that a significant
portion of a reconfigured evidence law might ultimately remain
statutory. But it will only be capable of being amended or repealed by
another act of Congress, not by Supreme Court rulemaking. If
Congress oversteps or specifies a constitutional jury right “incorrectly,”
the Court will have the ability to use its core Article III judicial power
to invalidate or interpret statutes in cases and controversies before it,
as befits the Constitution’s structural design.
This division of labor for a reimagined FRE is most likely to generate
a better balance for judiciary and legislature alike, bringing the
branches into better conversation about matters of constitutional
magnitude. The renovated REA can still sustain a “report-and-wait”
provision, which can give Congress the ability to weigh in on rules that

312. See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory,
101 MINN. L. REV. 2167 (2017); Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 123 (2015). Outside the FRE context, the Federal Rules are not statutes by and
large, so can have a sui generis interpretive approach rather than being subsumed in
debates about statutory interpretation more generally. Thus, moving most of the FRE
back into rule interpretation rather than statutory interpretation should be cleaner for
the whole of the federal rule regime.
313. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933 (1975) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. app.); Pub. L. No. 110-322, 122 Stat. 3537, 3537 (2008) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. app.). With these Acts, Congress took the principles laid out in FRE 501
and 502 and made them law.
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it believes the Court is getting wrong, too. And the Court can still
sustain its judicial supremacy on matters within its jurisdiction, so long
as it is using its Article III powers to do so. I have no doubt the Court
and the Advisory Committee would have a seat at the table when
Congress takes to doing its job of steering the FRE ship aright.
Still, there is reason to remain unsettled by the limited opportunity
for dialogue between the branches that the post-Chadha “report-andwait” provision currently affords.314 Since getting Congress and the
President mobilized to pass a law with full Article I, Section 7
compliance is a very challenging lift for countermanding what can
otherwise be unilateral action of the Supreme Court, some rethinking
of Chadha may ultimately be advisable. Not the part of it that requires
passing, amending, and repealing laws in ways that are in conformity
with constitutional procedures. That is what Chadha got right and part
of what undermines the current REA’s legitimacy as applied to the
FRE. But the FRE rulemaking context might be unique enough to
permit some loosening of the blanket invalidity of legislative vetoes. So
the Court might reconsider Chadha to this limited extent: in
connection with the FRE (as renovated according to the new imagined
regime I specified above), it would stimulate appropriate interbranch
dialogue to allow legislative vetoes to countermand rules of evidence
promulgated by the Supreme Court that genuinely touch on matters
of federalism and the jury.315 Because these are areas where there is a
good reason to respect congressional preferences and maintain a
legitimate concern about too much power being concentrated within
the judiciary, a limited exception to Chadha’s prohibition on legislative
vetoes is worth taking seriously here. Since the judiciary would be able
314. 28 U.S.C. § 2074.
315. The vision of “interbranch dialogue” I have in mind draws from the legal
process school’s suspicion of fetishistic formalism and its deep attention to
institutional competence. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“The Interrelationships of the Major
Lawmaking Institutions in a Unitary System”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2033 (1994)
(identifying core features of the legal process school and highlighting how institutions
can collaborate together); Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68, 90–91, 94–96 (1935)
(emphasizing attention to institutional competence); LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN
QUEST OF ITSELF 91, 123, 134, 192 (1940) (focusing on ways the interrelationships
between the legislature and the judiciary can improve law); MAKING POLICY, MAKING
LAW: AN INTERBRANCH PERSPECTIVE (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004).
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to use its Article III power in cases and controversies to make sure the
FRE comports with its vision of the Constitution anyway, enhancing the
possibilities for dialogue on these issues is ultimately to the good. And
since nothing about this limited exception to the legislative veto ban
involves supersession or having an entity other than the legislature
passing or repealing laws, the core of Chadha can be sustained.316
Before I conclude, I have to say something about how to think about
all the cases already decided under the current FRE, with its warts and
all. Although I am convinced that the REA process in amending and
repealing dimensions of the originally-enacted 1975 FRE is
fundamentally flawed, there is not likely a one-size-fits-all way to
approach the individualized unconstitutionality of the application of
any particular rule of evidence. Many rules in the FRE have sustained
their substantive shape since Congress passed them in 1975,317 so the
unconstitutionality of the REA’s contribution to the FRE is not likely
to undo many past cases. And even in the instances where an REAbased change should genuinely be thought to be unconstitutional, not
all will trigger “harmful errors” that would furnish parties with many
legitimate claims to upset final judgments.
On the civil side, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 would govern
the finality of judgments that might be challenged once Congress and
the Court appreciate the constitutional infirmity of the combination
of the REA with FRE.318 Here, it seems as if it would only be a very rare
case in which a district court would be authorized or motivated to upset
a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), the singular part of Rule 60 that
could sustain an effort to undo a judgment for an FRE problem.319 This

316. Another way through the thicket here, suggested to me by Aaron Bruhl, could
be to consider a mechanism of statutory fast-tracking to promote interbranch
cooperation, allowing the Advisory Committee to tee-up amendments to the FRE that
Congress would be required to consider without the filibuster. See generally AaronAndrew P. Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto? Legalities, Practicalities, and Some Puzzles, 10
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 447, 448–50 (2008). This strategy has the upside of not needing to
muck with current constitutional law—but the downside of an untested parliamentary
environment (and one that potentially gives Congress too much authority too often).
317. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1926–29 (1975) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. app.).
318. See FED R. CIV. P. 60 (outlining the court procedure for “mistake[s] arising from
oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment”).
319. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (“(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment,
Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
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is because it is legally settled that “[i]ntervening developments in the
law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary circumstances
required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).”320 Courts hearing Rule
60(b)(6) motions want to see that the party looking to be relieved from
judgment actually appealed.321 And “Rule 60(b) proceedings are
subject to only limited and deferential appellate review.”322 So the
floodgates are not likely to open for many civil cases.
Nor will many litigants on the criminal side have access to many
legitimate arguments to upset their convictions, either. First, even if
the REA-as-applied-to-the-FRE is constitutionally defective and needs
to change, one could reasonably be much less confident that as a
general matter all rule-level deficiencies that flowed from the process
failure should lead to retroactive relief per se. Collateral attacks based
on constitutionally-infirm FRE provisions would be subject to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 and Teague v. Lane’s preclusion of claims based on a “new rule”
in all but extreme cases.323 Even if Teague does not apply because a
court finds that a relevant defective FRE rule is not merely a
“procedural rule,”324 it still would seem to be very difficult for a litigant
to succeed on collateral review because the litigant would need to show
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered
in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.”).
320. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239 (1997).
321. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197–98, 202 (1950). This rule is
not ironclad. See Norgaard v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1074, 1076 (7th Cir.
1997); GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 477 F.3d 368, 374 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The
intervening-change-in-law exception . . . exists to protect those who, despite due
diligence, fail to prophesy a reversal of established adverse precedent.”); ShoshoneBannock Tribes of Fort Hall Rsrv. v. Leavitt, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1082 (D. Or. 2005).
322. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005).
323. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315–16 (1989). Teague’s application to § 2255
(rather than state prisoner collateral review under § 2254) is widely accepted. See, e.g.,
Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 347–48 (2013) (applying Teague to determine
whether the Court’s decision in Padilla applied retroactively). See generally RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1358 (7th ed. 2015) (“But although § 2255 contains no limitation on the scope of
review similar to that added in 1996 by § 2254(d), the courts of appeals have held that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane . . . which precludes habeas courts
from considering state prisoners’ claims based on new law in all but the most
exceptional cases . . . also governs § 2255 proceedings.”).
324. This distinction is clear in Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).

2022] ARE THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 975
that the error was “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a
complete miscarriage of justice.”325 Nevertheless, I cannot rule out the
possibility that some new litigation will arise about how to cope with
the fact that we have had a constitutionally unacceptable rulemaking
process in connection with the FRE for nearly half a century. That may
be the cost of correcting a long-standing constitutional error.
CONCLUSION
What we have are Federal Rules of Evidence that were first passed by
Congress as statutory law. Yet most dimensions of it can be and have
been superseded by a rulemaking process housed at the Supreme
Court, a process that is very hard to subject to meaningful judicial or
congressional review. This just is not how important law is supposed to
get made under our Constitution. The Supreme Court should be
hearing cases or controversies under its Article III power to vindicate
our constitutional rights, not making and repealing substantive federal
law that can impact federal-state relations and our constitutional jury
entitlements. The formal and functional separation of powers
established by the Constitution ultimately requires a new approach to
the FRE, one that does not permit Congress effectively to abdicate its
power of amending and repealing statutes of the United States to the
Supreme Court.

325. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).

